Articles/Comments The Two Faces of the
Terrorist: The State and Non-State
Actors
The Two Faces of the Terrorist: The State and
Non-State Actors
By: Mohd. Musib M. Buat
(A paper presented at the symposium on the “Unmasking
the Terrorist”, sponsored by the Center for International
Studies, University of the Philippines , U.P.NISMED, Diliman,
Quezon City, September 9,2004).
The Officer-in-
charge, Dr.Cynthia Neri Zayas, distinguished Speakers and
participants:
My thanks and appreciation to the
organizers of this symposium for inviting me and sharing with
you my thoughts and ideas on the subject of terrorism. The
title of the symposium, “ Unmasking the terrorist”, is very
timely and opportune in reminiscing the attack on the World
Trade Center at New York City, U.S.A on September 11, 2001.
Indeed, the so-called U.S. war on Terror has taken on
a new face and is currently changing the relations between
nations and countries. Peoples and nations are caught in a
dilemma in responding to the call of U.S President Bush: “You
are either with us or (you are with the Terrorists)?” However,
the basic problem underlying all these military actions or
threats of the use of force against a faceless enemy, as the
most recent one by the United States on a sovereign country
like Iraq, is the absence of an agreed or precise legal
definition of terrorism. One remarkable confusion as one
writer points out is the legal categorization of acts of
violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation
movements, or by individuals. (1) This dilemma is exemplified
by the saying: “One country’s terrorist is another country’s
freedom fighter.” The lack of consistency or apparent
contradiction in the use of the term “terrorism” may be borne
by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation
movements like Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habid Bourquiba
in Tunisia, and Ahmad Ben Bella in Algeria, among others, were
originally labeled as terrorists by regimes they had opposed
but later were internationally recognized as statesmen.
During the Philippine Revolution our own revolutionary
leaders or reformers like Andres Bonifacio, Emilio Aguinaldo,
Apolinario Mabini, Jose Rizal, to mention a few, were labeled
by the Spaniards as insurrectos, filibuster, bandidos, etc.
but they are now emulated as great Filipino heroes. Thus, “the
rebels of today are the heroes of tomorrow.” This will
similarly apply to the Bangsa Moro rebel leaders when their
dream of an independent Moro homeland will become a reality.
Definition of Terrorism
Under the
present unipolar international relations, one of the basic
slogans in justifying the use of force against certain states
and groups operating internationally is the “fight against
terrorism”. Since “terrorism” is perceived as a transnational
crime, the war against terrorism must likewise be borderless.
We are living in an unpredictable world where one dominant
power who plays the role of a world policeman makes the rules.
What then has become of the world body, the United Nations
Organization and its organs- that of a fait accompli or a
subservient body? What happened in Central Europe in the
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is too recent to recall.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) merely played
the role of a fait accompli.
The lists of states
“sponsoring terrorism” and terrorist organizations are drawn
up and constantly updated according to criteria totally
unknown to the public but merely dictated by strategic
interest, according to Hans Koechler. What is therefore the
defining criteria for terrorist acts as distinguished from
legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense? The
United Nations since the time of the Cold War has been
grappling in vain to come up on the basic definition of
terrorism. However, despite efforts, it has been unable to
bridge the gap between those who associate with any violent
act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries
or infrastructure or military installations, and those who
adhere to the legitimate use of force in resisting foreign
oppression or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or
religious groups within a particular state. (2)
The
international community is faced by the dilemma by reference
to the contradicting categorization of organizations and
movements like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
which is a terrorist group for Israel and liberation movement
for Arabs and Muslims, the Kashmiri resistance groups who are
perceived by India as terrorists and liberation fighters by
Pakistan, the Contras in Nicaragua as freedom fighters for the
United States, and terrorists for the Socialist group, and
most recently the Afghani Mujahedeen (who later become the
Taliban movement). During the Cold War period the latter were
freedom fighters for the West, supported by the United States,
and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. The lists of
conflicting categorization that cannot be reconciled would be
long to enumerate and the reason for these opposing
categorizations are dictated by political interest being the
roots of these perceptions. The divergent interest of states,
says Koechler, is the basic reason for these striking
inconsistencies in definitions and perceptions. It depends on
whether a state is in a position of an occupying power or in
that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a
particular territory, the definition of terrorism will
accordingly fluctuate.
It is primarily due to these
conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in
each and every instance how a particular armed group or
movement (non-state-actor), labeled as terrorist-freedom
fighter that made the United Nations unable to reach a precise
definition of terrorism. The result is a “policy of double
standards” in international affairs, says Koechler. This
“definitional predicament” has become more serious in the
present unipolar relations when one superpower exercises
decisional role in the Security Council while other former
great powers of the Cold War era has become marginalized. The
problem has become more acute since the September 11, 2001
attacks on the United States. (3)
Neither could we
find a precise definition of terrorism to come up with a
consistent anti-terrorism policy in the various conventions
and resolutions of the United Nations. Due to this lack of
consensus among member states on the basic criteria defining
terrorism, there exist only implicit or operative definitions
of terrorism. The unresolved dilemma is summed up in the
formula, according Koechler, “terrorism versus national
liberation”. Examples of “operative” definitions are numerous.
Under Art.5 of the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), terrorist acts are
considered as “criminal acts…, in particular where they are
intended or calculated to provoke state of terror in the
general public or a group of persons or particular
persons,”...; that those acts - “are under no circumstances
justifiable by considerations of political, philosophical,
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar
nature.”
Another operative definition is found in
General Assembly resolution 54/110 of February 2000 which
describe terrorism in the sense of “criminal acts intended or
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public,
group of persons or particular persons for political reasons.”
The United Nations General Assembly resolution 51/210
of December 17, 1996 established an AD HOC Committee task “to
elaborate on international convention for the suppression of
terrorist bombings”. The committee since its establishment has
been working on a comprehensive international treaty on
terrorism, but failed to draw up one to date. The Committee
Chairman, Rohan Perera (Sri Lanka) reported that Art.2 of the
draft convention on the definition of terrorism and Art.18
concerning acts of “armed forces” or “parties” to a conflict
and reference to “ foreign occupation“ could not be agreed
upon by the committee members. There was therefore no
consensus reached covering who would be entitled to exclusion
from the draft treaty’s scope. The exemption of national
liberation movements was a delicate question. The members of
the committee took into account the concerns of the member
states of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), with
particular regard to the status of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization which could not be reconciled with the views of
the groups of the Western states. Thus, the divergent
political interests and contradicting normative perceptions
cannot be reconciled by mere reference to the universal
principles of human rights as forming part of jus cogens of
general international law. (4)
In an address by the
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan before the General Assembly on
October 1, 2001, he acknowledged that the definition of
terrorism as one most difficult issue brought before the world
organization and that he admits and accepts “the need for
legal precision”. (5) The Secretary-General pointed to the
existing body of norms of international humanitarian law
providing that even in situations of armed conflict, the
targeting of innocent civilians is illegal.”(6) Indeed, the
binding norms of international humanitarian law may give a
useful hint on how to bridge the gap in the opposing views
concerning the definition of terrorism as a crime, observes
Koechler.
Towards a Comprehensive
Definition of Terrorism
A comprehensive definition
of terrorism, including the binding measures in the use of
force by means of integration into existing instruments of
international humanitarian law necessarily requires a precise
legal definition of the term ”terrorism”. That such definition
must likewise include a clear distinction between criminal
acts of terrorism and acts of resistance against foreign
occupation and/or of national liberation movements. The
principle of “unity of normative knowledge” enunciated in Hans
Kelsen’s theory of international law must be adhered to
particularly in regard to the necessity to place regulations
concerning terrorist as in a normative framework generally
acceptable. The norms of international humanitarian law as
those laid dawn in the Geneva Conventions and the norms
defining and regulating terrorism as an offense have to be
harmonized to avoid a “policy of double standards.” Basic
legal rules related to politically motivated violent acts
against civilians should be harmonized to make it legally
consistent to include the term “state terrorism” in the
general definition of terrorism. (7)
The common
Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and particularly the
Fourth General Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 may be
equally applied to acts of politically motivated violence in a
no-war situation, irrespective of whether of an international
or national situation. For a comprehensive approach,
Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Convention for the
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts
(1977) should also be applied. Article 13(2) provides: “The
civilian populations as such, as well as individual civilians,
shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence
the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among
civilian population are prohibited”.
As early as 1987,
this approach was advocated in the International Progress
Organization’s Geneva Declaration on Terrorism.(8) This was an
effort towards a comprehensive definition of acts involving
states, groups and individuals on the international and
national level. This comprehensive approach, observes
Koechler, is compatible with and even complementary to the UN
General Assembly concerns on the principle of
self-determination and the “inalienable right to
self-determination and independence of all peoples… under
foreign occupation” resulting therefrom, with the consequence
of “upholding the legitimacy of… struggle of national
liberation movements’ (resolution 46/15 of 9th of December
1991).” The unified approach suggested must be in conformity
with the spirit of General Assembly resolutions, acts of
national resistance that will not be criminalized per se but
will be judged in consonance to the same rules as acts of
regular warfare by a national army. In this way, both state
and non-state actors shall be held by the same standards of
international rules of humanitarian law. It is also possible
to bridge the existing gap between the normative perceptions
of the group of Islamic states on one hand, and the western
states on the other hand. It was the opposing views of the two
groups that prevented reaching a compromise on the issue of
definition of terrorism that was proposed by Australia in the
AD HOC Committee of the General Assembly earlier in November
2001.
It should, however, be made clear that
resistance or national liberation movements under such
codification effort must in no way resort to terrorist tactics
and that a politically legitimate aim does not necessarily
justify the means. Under the unified framework system of
international humanitarian law, terrorist methods will be
punishable irrespective of the specific political purpose, and
irrespective of whether those acts are committed by liberation
movements or regular armies of existing regimes. The dilemma
faced by the General Assembly AD HOC Committee could be solved
on the basis of the comprehensive approach.
The issue
of exempting certain groups fighting foreign occupation will
no longer be an issue because groups fighting foreign
occupation or liberation movements will be subject to the same
rules defined for the behavior of states in the Geneva
Convention of 1949 from the application of the proposed
anti-terrorism convention. Both the military and non-military
groups, state and non-state actors (even without a formally
declared war) will be subject to the same standards or rules.
(9)
On the other hand, the central and unresolved
question is still: who has the “power of definition”? Under
the unipolor system, it is even more difficult to resolve the
underlying conflicts of interests between member states in the
world organization, the United Nations.
Suggested
Conditions for a Consistent Anti-Terrorist Policy of the
United Nations
It is suggested by Koechler that
the United Nations can only establish a cohesive
anti-terrorist strategy based on the rule of law and on the
provisions of its charter if the following conditions are
meet, to wit:
· Existing legal standards and
conventions are integrated into a universal system of norms
that serves as ‘common denominator’ for the respective
sub-system, or – vice-versa- if a comprehensive convention on
terrorism eventually to be adopted by the General Assembly is
being integrated into the existing set of norms of
international humanitarian law;
· particular interests
of member states , including the most powerful ones, are
effectively held in check in the negotiating process leading
to the adoption of an international convention;
· an
institution of an “international arbiter” is created in regard
to sanctions and penalties to be imposed on the basis of such
a convention, and if this body is able to act in an
independent, objective and unbiased manner (similar to the
International Court of Justice’s mode of operation); (and)
· the veto privilege of the permanent members of the
Security Council is abolished so as to allow an international
arbiter to act in complete independence and without
interference from the “executive branch” of the United
Nations.” (10)
The reason for the last condition is
based on the observation that up to the present, the veto
privilege has in fact granted de facto, though not de jure
immunity to many violators of international humanitarian law,
even to perpetrators of state terrorism. This is so because of
the simple procedural rule that no enforcement action could be
done if the perpetrator of the violation is a permanent member
of the Security Council or its ally. (11) Such state of
affairs have demoralized the international community with
respect to the requirements of universal law enforcement,
whether against states or individuals. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) should be entrusted with the jurisdiction
in cases of terrorism committed by states or non-states when
it becomes operational. But when will it become operative? As
of August 31, 2001 there were 139 signatures and 37 parties.
Under Art.126 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, it will enter into force on the first day of
the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit
of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession. The present efforts towards a comprehensive
codification of norms on terrorism is highlighted by the
persistent opposition of the United States to the creation and
coming into force of the Statute of Rome and the US
administration is even threatening sanctions against states
intending to ratify the Statute of Rome. But if we truly
believe in the United Nations as the universal guarantor of
the rule of law and in the global community, there is no other
alternative for a comprehensive, unified and universal
codification, as discussed above.
Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) The International Criminal
Court (ICC) will be a permanent independent judicial body
created by the International Community through the Rome
Statute. It has the power to prosecute the gravest crimes
under international law such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Unlike the
International Court of Justice (ICJO) which deal with states,
its main distinctive feature is that the ICC deals with and
has the power to investigate, prosecute and convict
individuals. It is a permanent body based in the Hague unlike
the ad hoc tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. It came about
on July 17, 1998 when one hundred and twenty (120) States
voted in support of the Final Text of the Rome Statute seeking
to establish the International Criminal Court. About
twenty-one (21) States abstained and seven (7) voted against
it, among them the United States, China, Japan, India and
Israel. By December 2000, the deadline set for signing of the
Statute, 139 countries have signed including the Philippines
and USA. Reportedly, President Arroyo has not yet endorsed the
instrument to the Senate for ratification; while the Bush
administrations as of May 2, 2002 remained un-signed. On April
11, 2002, ten (10) States simultaneously deposited their
instruments of ratification at the UN headquarters in New
York, crossing the threshold of 60 ratifications necessary for
the Rome Statute to enter into force which was supposed to be
last July 2002.
According to the ICRC, “Armed
conflicts inevitably give rise to abusive behavior, and the
forces directly involved in the hostilities are not the only
ones to suffer the consequences.” Military actions often hurt
innocent civilians while the perpetrators are often protected
by their state or remain powerful enough to avoid conviction
in their national territory. It is only by holding individuals
accountable for violations of international law will the
global community be able to deal effectively with the
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community. This is crucial because it will aid
both present victims and to deter future criminals. Thus, in
countries where the courts are incapable of dealing with
individual violations of international humanitarian law, the
ICC could step in. Such a court could deter future dictators
from killing their own nationals. On the other hand, the
maintenance of international peace would greatly benefit from
the existence of the ICC. While it is true that UN
peacekeepers can sometimes stop wholesale slaughter by placing
themselves between warring factions, we have seen that in
Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti and other places, the hatred
that fuels the violence does not just go away after the
shooting stops. The cycle of violence continues so long as the
people involved feel that justice has not been served. We saw
this in East Timor.
The various principles of
international law and criminal law also govern the ICC. These
are:
“a. Non-retroactivity of the Statute. Only crimes
committed after the Statute is in force will be cognizable by
the ICC. This means that crimes committed under the Marcos
regime cannot be prosecuted under the ICC.
b. No
impunity such as statutes of limitation should be permitted,
non-amnesties, pardons, immunity of officials, or similar
measures of impunity should be recognized.
c. Trials
must be fair, and should observe due process.
d.
Non-imposition of the death penalty. The Court may order
compensation or reparation of the victims.
e.
Protection for victims and witnesses.”(12)
The
establishment of the ICC is one hope for justice when one
cannot have justice in his own country since it has
jurisdiction over individual perpetrators of heinous crimes
such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Ironically, the Philippines has not yet ratified as far as we
know the Rome Statute for the ICC. President Estrada had
signed the Rome Statute for the ICC on December 28, 2000. It
has been stuck and long awaiting action under the Arroyo
administration. A Senate resolution is reportedly waiting but
the instrument for ratification is not yet in the Senate.
Meantime, the United States has been exerting efforts to seek
exemption from the ICC. This must have influenced the Arroyo
government for inaction?
If the US is not a State
party of the Rome Statute and has renounced the court, it will
not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction and will not submit to
any of its orders. In cases of crimes covered by the court are
committed by any American soldier or official and they are not
prosecuted domestically or by the US, the victims or aggrieved
party will have no other venue for redress. The award of
US$1.9 billion in civil and moral damages by the Court of
Hawaii for martial law victims remains unenforced. Since the
ICC has universal jurisdiction, the ICC will be the only hope
of the Martial law victims to facilitate the enforcement of
the judgment of the Hawaii court.
Crimes within the Jurisdiction of
the ICC
“The Court will deal with the most serious
crimes committed by individuals: genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and aggression. These crimes are
specified in the Statute and are carefully defined to avoid
ambiguity and vagueness. Crimes of aggression will also be
dealt with by the Court when State Parties have agreed on the
definition, elements, and conditions under which the Court
will exercise jurisdiction.
a. Genocide is any one of
a number of acts aimed at the destruction of all or part of
certain groups of people. It is this intent that distinguishes
genocide from other crimes against humanity.
Under
Article 6 of the Statute, the following five prohibited
acts-if committed with the intention to destroy “in whole or
part” a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such, may constitute genocide:
· killing members of
the group;
· causing serious bodily harm or mental
harm to the members of a group;
· deliberately
inflicting on a group conditions of life calculated to bring
about their physical destruction in whole or in part;
· imposing measures intended to prevent births within
a group;(and)
· forcibly transferring children of a
group to another group.
Under Article 25 (3) (b) of
the Statute, anyone who orders, solicits, or induces someone
who committed the acts of genocide, is also guilty of
genocide.
Anyone can be tried for genocide, no matter
what the person’s position. This means that not only those who
pulled the trigger whether foot soldiers or next door
neighbors can be guilty of the crime but also the head of
state or government minister who planned or ordered the act.
The ICC jurisdiction does not allow for immunity afforded to
heads of state. Following illegal orders of superiors is not a
defense to genocide.
b. Crimes against humanity were
first codified in an international instrument in the Charter
of the Nuremberg Trial in 1945 and were recognized as part of
international law. They have now been clearly defined in an
international treaty under the Rome Statute and is
distinguished from ordinary crimes in 3 ways:
First,
the acts constituting said crimes such as murder, must have
been “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack”;
Second, they must be knowingly directed against a
civilian population;
Third, they must have been
committed pursuant to a “State or organizational policy”. Thus
they can be committed by state agents or by persons acting at
their instigation or with their acquiescence, such as
vigilantes or para-military units. Crimes against humanity can
also be committed pursuant to policies of organizations, such
as rebel groups, which have no connection with the government.
The Rome Statute covers 11 types of acts, which may
amount to crimes against humanity:
1. Murder;
2. Extermination which includes depriving people
access to food or medicine, calculated to bring about their
destruction;
3. Enslavement, or the exercise of power
of ownership over a person, including trafficking of persons;
4. Forcible transfer of population, or deportation or
forcing people to leave an area in which they are lawfully
present, without grounds permitted under international law;
5. Imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of international law;
6. Torture,
defined as intentionally causing severe physical or mental
suffering to a person in custody or under the control of the
accused;
7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
8. Persecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law or in
connection with any crime under the Statute;
9.
Enforced disappearance-the arrest, detention or abduction of
persons, by or with the authorization, consent or acquiescence
of a state or a political organization, followed by either:
· a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom
· or a refusal to give information on the fate of the
disappeared persons with the intention of removing them from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time;
10. Apartheid-inhumane acts committed in the context
of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and
domination by one racial group over the other racial group
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime; and
11.Other inhumane acts of similar character
intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to
body or mental or physical health.
These crimes can be
committed either in time of peace or armed conflict. There is
no requirement that crimes against humanity take place during
armed conflict.
c. War crimes have been punishable by
national courts since the Middle Ages. There have been
numerous international humanitarian treaties developed in
1900s notably the Hague Convention IV of 1907, and its
Regulations, the four Geneva Convention of 1949 and their 1977
Protocols.
Article 8 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC
jurisdiction over a wide range of war crimes committed during
international armed conflicts which are recognized in these
treaties and international customary law. It also reaffirmed
recent developments in international law by giving the ICC the
power to try war crimes committed in internal armed conflicts,
such as civil wars, which are the most common conflicts today.
Unlike crimes against humanity, a war crime can be single,
isolated, dispersed or random act, without any requirement
that it be widespread or systematic.
These war crimes can fall into two
major categories.
First, the ICC can try person
accused of grave breaches of the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 including the following willful acts when committed
against protected persons such as wounded soldiers,
shipwrecked sailors, prisoners of war, civilians in occupied
territories:
· willful killing;
· torture or
inhuman treatment including biological experiment;
·
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
and health;
· wanton destruction and appropriation of
property not justified by military necessity;
·
compelling prisoners of war or other protected persons to
serve in the forces of a hostile power;
· willfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair trial;
· unlawful deportation and confinement;(and)
·
taking of hostages.
Second, the Court has jurisdiction
over serious violations of laws or customs applicable in
international conflict within established framework of
international law, including violations recognized in the
Hague Regulations and Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions and
International customary law, including, among others:
· prohibited attacks on civilians such as civilian
objects, humanitarian assistance or peace keeping missions;
· attacks when it is known that it will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage
civilian objects or severe damage to the environment, which
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated;
·
attacks on buildings, materials, medical units and transport
personnel using Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems;
·
against buildings, dedicated to religion, education, art,
science, or charitable purposes; historic monuments and
hospitals, provided they are not military objectives;
· harm to defenseless persons such as killing or
wounding soldiers who have surrendered, physical ,mutilation
or medical or scientific experiments which are neither
medically justified or in the interest of the persons, and
which seriously endangers their health;
· outrages
upon personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment;
· rape and other forms of sexual violence and the use
of human shields;
· Prohibited methods of warfare,
such as misuse of a flag of truce, UN or enemy insignia,
emblems of the Red Cross or Red Crescent;
· Declaring
that no quarters will be given, pillaging, seizing or
destroying enemy property unless justified by military
necessity;
· Use of prohibited weapons such as poison,
certain gases, expanding bullets, and other weapons added to
the Statute by amendment;
· Intentionally using
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare;
·
Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen
years into the national armed forces or using them actively in
hostilities; and
· Certain prohibited acts in occupied
territory including the transfer by the occupier of parts of
its own civilian population into the territory; or the
deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of
the occupied territory; or abolishing or suspending legal
rights of enemy nationals.
Internal
Conflict
In case of an armed conflict not of an
international character, the Court has jurisdiction over
serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions namely the following acts committed against
persons “taking no active part in the hostilities”:
·
violence to life and person (like) murder, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
· committing outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
· taking of hostages;
· passing
sentence and carrying out executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable.
It can also try other serious violations of
humanitarian law recognized in Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions, including:
1. Intentionally directing
attacks against civilian population as such, or against
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
2. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings,
material, medical units, and transport and personnel using the
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions (such as the Red
Cross or the Red Crescent);
3. Intentionally directing
attacks against personnel or vehicles, involved in
humanitarian assistance and UN peacekeeping missions;
4. Intentionally directing attacks against a building
dedicated to religion, education, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military
objectives;
5. Pillaging a town or place, even when
taken by assault;
6. Committing rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence;
7. Conscripting or enlisting children of under the age
of 15 into the armed forces or groups or using them to
participate actively in hostilities;
8. Ordering the
displacement of civilian population for reasons related to the
conflict not justified by their security or imperative
military reasons;
9. Killing or wounding treacherously
a combatant adversary;
10. Declaring that no quarters
will be given;
11. Subjecting persons who are in the
power of another party to the conflict to physical mutilation
or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are
neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment
of the person concerned, and which cause death to or seriously
endanger the health of such person;(and)
12.
Destroying or seizing the property of the adversary unless
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of the conflict.
d. The Crime of
Aggression What constitute the crime of aggression will still
be discussed by signatories to the ICC. In international law,
the concept of aggression has been slowly taking shape
particularly in cases involving military actions involving the
US, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and El Salvador.
Some
countries such as the United States, voted against the
inclusion of the crime of Aggression in the Statute, fearful
that it would expose military commanders who conduct military
operations in other countries. The trial and punishment of
violators of the crime of aggression can only be enforced once
state signatories agree on its definition and elements.” (13)
Extent of the Court’s Jurisdiction
The
ICC has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed
after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. It has no
retroactive effect. Crimes committed under the Marcos and
Suharto regimes can no longer be punished under the Statute.
In cases where the crime or complaint was referred by a State
or initiated by the Prosecutor, the ICC may exercise its
jurisdiction if one or more of the following states are
Parties to the Statute or have accepted ICC’s jurisdiction:
a. The State on the territory which the alleged crime
occurred;
b. The state of which the person accused of
the crime is a national.
Those States which did not
sign or ratify the Statute, although not under the court’s
jurisdiction, may accept the jurisdiction of the ICC and
cooperate in the implementation of the Statute. (14)
Obligations of State-Parties
State-parties under the Rome Statute have two basic
obligations, namely: complementarity and full cooperation.
States under the Statute have the primary responsibility of
bringing parties or individuals responsible for genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes to justice. It is
therefore the “duty of every state to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”
under the Statute. Being part of international law, such
prohibited and punishable acts form part of the law of the
land under the Philippine Constitution. Thus, they can be
equally be prosecuted before the national courts. Article 1 of
the Rome Statute provides that the court “shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”. It means
that the ICC will be able to act only when states with
responsibility over an accused who is either resident or
national, are unable or unwilling to prosecute the above
mentioned crimes.
Under this principle States are
expected to enact and then enforce national legislation which
provides that crimes under international laws are also crimes
under national law whenever they have been committed, no
matter who committed them or who is the victim. It is
therefore only when states are unable or unwilling to
prosecute offenders will the Court be able to have
jurisdiction over an accused.
State parties under Art.
86 agree to “cooperate fully with the Court in the
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court.” They should ensure that the ICC
Prosecutor and the defense can conduct effective investigation
in their jurisdiction, that their courts and other authorities
provide full cooperation in obtaining documents, locating and
seizing assets of the accused, conducting searches and
seizures of evidence, locating and protecting witnesses and
arresting and surrendering persons accused of crimes in the
Court. The State shall also cooperate with the Court in
enforcing sentences by making detention facilities available
to convicted person. (15)
How Cases are Initiated
before the Court
Taking into consideration the
principles of complementarity, there are three (3) ways that
an ICC investigation may be initiated:
“First, a
State-Party may refer a ‘situation’ to the Prosecutor, where
it appears that one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court was committed (Art.13.a and Art.14).
Second,
the Security Council may refer a ‘situation’ to the Prosecutor
(Art.13.b).
Third, the Prosecutor may initiate
investigation moto propio or on her own, on the basis of
information from any reliable source as to the commission of
crimes (Art.13.c and Art.15). This is where individuals or
NGO’s may file a ‘complaint’ with the Prosecutor who in turn
may conduct an investigation.”
Under any of the above
procedure, the Prosecutor may then apply for a warrant of
arrest with the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber for the arrest and
surrender of the suspect and if approved, a warrant of arrest
shall be issued. The Court also recognizes and incorporates
all the fundamental guarantees of the right to fair trial
recognized in international law such as right against
self-incrimination, right to counsel, against coercion and
duress and double jeopardy. The imposition of death penalty is
not sanctioned under the Rome Statute. (16)
International Criminal Court and U.S. National
Security
As signatory to the treaty (Rome
Statute), the U.S. is bound not to work against the purposes
and objectives of the Treaty. This was noted by Secretary of
State Powell in his confirmation testimony. Some of the
critical point of concerns in U.S. policy-making on the
International Criminal Court (ICC) are as follows:
I.
The ICC is “significantly flawed” and the U.S. should seek a
full exemption from the ICC jurisdiction.
It has been
noted that the only outstanding “flaw” in the treaty cited
during the Clinton Administration was the Court’s jurisdiction
over individuals from countries that have not ratified the
Treaty. The fact is that U.S. citizens and soldiers who commit
crimes abroad are currently subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial state in which the crime is committed. On the
other hand, the ICC will have jurisdiction over the personnel
of non-Party States only when these individuals commit crimes
under the jurisdiction of the ICC in the territory of a State
Party, or in the territory of a state that has chosen to
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. Until the U.S. ratifies
the Treaty, the Court can only try Americans if they commit
crimes in countries that have accepted the Court’s
jurisdiction.
A non-partisan American Academy of Arts
and Sciences report states that “(M)ost ICC signatories
reportedly see little reason to create such an exemption,
which appears designed to reward non-signatories and undermine
the concept that all individuals are subject to the relevant
international law. It appears highly unlikely that such a
“fix” will be attained….”
This U.S. efforts for
exemption are alienating their closest friends and allies, for
whom the creation of a fair and effective ICC is a high
foreign policy priority. In the Preparatory Commission
(PreCom) meeting last November 2000, the German Delegation
Head announced the German ratification of the treaty with a
unanimous vote in the Bundestag. The German Government was
warned and advised not to admit any changes of or exemptions
from the Rome Statute. He further said that on the German
side, they are confident that together with the members of the
European Union, and all the 110 Signatory States, will not
fail to fully safeguard the integrity of the Rome Statute.
Although the U.S. efforts at exemption will not
succeed, it is imperative that a U.S. negotiator at the table
will be present. There are important decisions to be made on
financial regulations and rules, privileges and immunities,
and other aspects relative to the court in the next PreCon
sessions. Thus, it is in the interests of U.S. national
security to continue positively engaged in the process of
creating the Court.
II. Another concern is that U.S.
military and civilian personnel and officials may be subject
to frivolous or politically motivated charges by the Court.
Considering that there are hundreds of thousands of soldiers
deployed around the world, the U.S. would be the subject to be
unjustly targeted.
A suggested option is that the ICC
must defer to national courts under the principle of
complementarity. It may not proceed with any case that is
genuinely being already investigated or prosecuted by a state
which has jurisdiction, or has already been investigated by a
state which has jurisdiction over it and that the state has
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, or the person
has already been tried for the same offense. Significantly,
U.S. civilian and military negotiators subsequent to the
conclusion of the Rome Treaty, worked hard to develop
procedures that limit the likelihood of politicized
prosecutions through greater precision in the definitions of
crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, among other
protections. The efforts of the U.S delegations on substantive
and technical issues has enormously strengthened the Rome
Statute.
Another plus factor in the Statute is that
any crime committed by an American would have to constitute a
core crime under the ICC and would be subject to threshold for
investigation and prosecution. All three crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, require some sort of
plan, policy or strategy to commit the crimes, and the crimes
must be committed as part of pattern of such crimes. Thus, the
thresholds are so high that the U.S. and its official
personnel could never, under U.S. law, plan and engage in such
extraordinary severe, serious and systematic crimes. Besides,
the Court will not acquire jurisdiction over individual crimes
such as rapes, looting, or bar brawls, unless it could be
shown that they were the result of an official U.S. policy. It
is also submitted that atrocities committed by rogue units,
like the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam, would not fall within the
Court’s jurisdiction.
On top of this, crimes falling
under the Court’s jurisdictions has already been declared
illegal for U.S. soldiers to commit under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and the War Crimes Act (1996), according to
Judge Robinson O. Everett of the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals. These laws have already created jurisdiction over war
crimes on the part of U.S. courts-martial. Thus, under the
principle of complementarity, the U.S. has basis for
maintaining that U.S. service personnel accused of crimes
prohibited by the Statute should be tried by the U.S.
courts-martial and not by the ICC.
III. A third concern is the view
that the ICC seems unconstitutional because it does not
provide for a jury trial.
The U.S. Department of
Justice have ruled that there are no constitutional barriers
to joining the ICC. It is submitted that the ICC’s procedural
protections constitute full U.S. Bill of Rights protections
for accused persons, except for jury trials. But the right to
jury trials in the Bill of Rights applies only to cases tried
in the U.S. Active duty members of the armed forces are not
guaranteed jury trials under the U.S. Constitution. Americans,
it has been observed, have been extradited for trial abroad
for hundreds of years, even to system without American-style
justice system.
IV. The fourth concern is that the
existence of the ICC might dampen U.S. military participation
in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
There is no
need for the U.S. to change its strategy because its strategy
already conforms to international and domestic law in field
operations. The Statute provides that the ICC must defer to
agreements between states, such as U.S. Status of Forces
Agreements, before proceeding with a request for surrender
(Art. 98). The U.S. usually requires a SOFA or similar
agreement before engaging in peacekeeping or humanitarian
missions. (17)
The Philippine Position and the
Global War Against Terrorism
The Philippine
government has not yet ratified the Rome Statute establishing
the International Criminal Court, for whatever reason it is
still unknown to date. In a press statement by Representative
Loretta Ann P. Rosales of Party-List AKBAYAN on May 8, 2002
before the Philippine Coalition on the International Criminal
Court, she stated that:
“The reported “un-signing” by
the United States of the Rome Statute is outrageously
short-sighted and the height of arrogance and hypocrisy. Bush
administration officials are saying that it was a mistake for
the Clinton administration to have signed the treaty
establishing the International Criminal Court and that the
signature is no longer legally binding. Neither will they
recognize the court’s jurisdiction, nor submit to any of its
orders or cooperate with it. The Rome Statute is now in force
and effect after having reached the required 60 ratifications
last month. The International Criminal Court, which is being
set up in The Hague in the Netherlands, will have jurisdiction
over crimes committed after July 1 of this year (2002) and
will begin operations next year (2003). The U.S. has even gone
further to say that it will not be bound by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a 1969 multilateral treaty
which establishes the rules on the observance of international
agreements between states to which the U.S. is also a party.
Under it, states are obliged to refrain from taking steps to
undermine treaties they sign, even if they do not ratify them.
“The U.S. renunciation of the Rome State is ominous,
in the light of the so-called global war against terrorism’
which the U.S. leads and which has extended to our shores with
the Balikatan war exercises. The U.S. is waging this global
war ostensibly in the name of high moral values and
internationally accepted norms of conduct and behavior in the
wake of the 11th September 2001 terror attacks in New York and
Washington, D.C., and yet it refuses to be bound by the same
standards. Reports from the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan
against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda network of Osama bin
Laden reveal that atrocities have been committed by U.S.
troops there. The possibility of it happening here in the
jungles of Basilan, the mountains of Central Mindanao and the
plains of Central Luzon is not remote.
“This also
shows an alarming trend towards unilateralism on the part of
the U.S. It seems so easy for it to reject its obligations
under multilateral treaties when it does not suit its purpose.
Recently, it rejected the Kyoto Protocol and its obligations
under the International Convention on Climate Change. In the
past, it rejected the ruling of the International Court of
Justice that held it liable for mining the harbors of
Nicaragua during the Reagan-sponsored Contra war against the
Sandinista regime then.
“We hope that the Philippine
government would show better sense and largeness of mind than
Uncle Sam in this regard, although its inaction on the matter
of ratification of the Rome Stature has been pathetic so far.
It has been one-and-a half years since former President Joseph
Estrada signed the Rome Stature on 28th of December 2000, but
the executive department has so far failed to formally endorse
the treaty to the Senate for ratification. We hope that
government inaction is not a case of a ‘follow-the-leader
mentality on the part of the Philippines.” (18)
Dr.
Aurora A Parong, Executive Director of the Task Force
Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), concurrent Deputy
Chairperson of the Philippine Coalition for the International
Criminal Court (PC-ICC), similarly issued a statement on May
8, 2002, expressing disappointment in the U.S. rejection of
the International Criminal Court and calls it as a step
backward for international criminal justice. A portion of her
statement is quoted as follow:” (19)
“We find no
justification to the recent unsigning of the US agreement of
the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. This is
a rejection of the world tribunal which can help deliver
justice to victims of heinous crimes such those of the
dictator Marcos, when government and domestic judicial system
is unable and unwilling to prosecute perpetrators of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression.
This is a regressive action for international criminal
justice.
We have reasons to be concerned about the US
move. The unsigning has several problematic implications to
the Philippines.
· President Arroyo might do a Bush.
President Arroyo might follow the action of President Bush of
‘unsigning’. If President Arroyo, who has supported US policy
in the past, unsigns or not endorse the Rome Statute for
ratification, the citizens of the Philippines will be deprived
of another venue to seek justice for grave crimes.
In
the US, the Rome Statute for the international court was
signed by the previous president, President Clinton. Similar
to the US, the Rome Statute was signed by a previous
president, President Estrada. The Philippine signature was
done in December 28, 2000. It is 17 months since the signature
and yet, the President (in behalf of the Executive branch of
government) has not endorsed the world court’s documents to
the Senate for ratification. Thus, despite the fact that
Senator Loren Legarda Leviste has filed a resolution for
ratification, this cannot be acted upon due to the absence of
the documents.
· In case there is commission by any
American soldier or official of any of the crimes covered by
the court and they are not prosecuted domestically or by the
US, then there is no other venue for redress of the victims
and their families. This has serious implications considering
that there are many American soldiers and officials outside
the US. In the Philippines, there are about thousands coming
in and out related to the Balikatan exercises.
· In
case of a crime of aggression-where another country attacks
the Philippines-our country will have no venue for redress. So
far, this is the only court which will have jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression. For a country like the Philippines,
which has been a victim of aggressive attacks and colonization
by other countries and where hundreds of thousands of our
people were killed because of such, the International Criminal
Court is a hope for justice for the future. If we recall about
200,000 were killed among our people during the Fil-American
war.
The failure of governments to prosecute dictators
and perpetrators of heinous crimes doubly victimize our
already impoverished bodies and souls. We view the
International Criminal Court as one hope for justice when we
cannot have justice in our country. We are keeping our finger
crossed that President Arroyo will not do a Bush unsigning.’”
As finally pointed out by Representative Rosales,
“(I)t is not yet too late for the Philippine government to get
on board the process of setting up the ICC. It should expedite
the process of ratification before the first meeting of the
Assembly of State Parties takes place in a couple of months.
The Arroyo administration should demonstrate to the country
and the world that her government is on the side of victims of
human rights violations and not that of transgressors,
dictators and war criminals, and that it is on the side of
justice and not of impunity. It should also show that, unlike
the U.S., understands and upholds the time-honored principle
in international law of pacta sunt servanda-agreements should
be honored and observed. Simply put in Pilipino: “Kapag
pinirmahan mo, pangatawanan mo!” (20)
State and
Non-State Actors in Low Intensity Conflicts
Internal armed conflicts or wars of low intensity such
as civil wars and liberation movements are most common
conflicts today. In the absence of a comprehensive
international treaty on terrorism, there is no precise legal
definition of the term “terrorism”. And such definition must
include a clear distinction between, criminal acts of
terrorism and acts of resistance against foreign occupation
and/or of national liberation. That a comprehensive definition
shall likewise include acts by states, groups and individuals
on the international as well as on the national level. The
comprehensive approach must also be compatible with and even
complementary to the UN General Assembly’s concern of the
principle of self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter
and the “inalienable right to self-determination and
independence of all peoples… under foreign occupation
resulting therefrom, with the consequence of “upholding the
legitimacy of … the struggle of national liberation
movements’” (resolution 46/51 of December 1991). In conformity
with the General Assembly resolutions, acts of national
resistance shall not be criminalized per se, but shall be
judged according to the same rules as acts of regular warfare
by a national army. Thus, both state and non-state actors
shall be held by the same standards of international
humanitarian law. (21)
Under the Rome Statute, crimes
against humanity is distinguished from ordinary crimes in
three ways: ”First, the acts constituting said crimes such as
murder, must have been ‘committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack;’ “Second, they must be knowingly directed
against a civilian population; and third, they must have been
committed pursuant to a “State or organizational policy”. In
case of a State, they can be committed by state agents or by
persons acting at their instigation or with their
acquiescence, such as vigilantes or para-military units. It
can also be committed pursuant to policies of organization,
such as rebel groups, which have no connection with the
government. The Rome State covers eleven types of acts
amounting to crimes against humanity.
Article 8 of the
Rome Statute has incorporated the Hague Convention IV of 1907,
and its Regulations, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
their 1977 Protocols. The ICC has jurisdiction over a wide
range of war crimes committed during international armed
conflicts, including the power to try war crimes committed in
an internal armed conflicts. Unlike crimes against humanity, a
war crime can be single, isolated, dispersed or random act,
without any requirement that it be widespread or systematic.
Paragraph 2(c), Art. 8 of the Rome Statute covers
serious violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions in case of armed conflict not of an international
character committed against persons, taking no active part in
the hostilities”, namely:
1. violence to life and
person, such as murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
2. committing outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
3.
taking of hostages;
4. passing sentence and carrying
out executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees
generally recognized as indispensable.
The ICC has
also the power to try other serious violations of humanitarian
law recognized in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which
constitute serious violations of the laws and custom
applicable in armed conflict not of an international
character. Paragraph 2(e) of Art. 8 of the Rome Statute
enumerates twelve (12) prohibited acts. Paragraph 2(c) of Art.
8 does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such ad riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence or other acts of a similar nature. (22)
Liberation Movements and Islamic
Militancy in the Asean Region
The ASEAN Region is
an Islamic Archipelago stretching from southern Thailand down
to the Malay peninsula towards the Indonesian Archipelago to
the Moluccas Islands and upward towards Borneo, Mindanao and
Sulu islands, including southern Palawan in Southern
Philippines. (23) The region is a hosts to the so-called
“moderate” or “Political Islam” which has lived in
co-existence with their secular regimes. The rise of Islamic
militancy is not new to the region. During the regime of
Sukarno in Indonesia, a radical Islamic movement known as
“Darul-Islam” emerged to contest the Sukarno secular role.
This was short-lived after its leaders were either neutralized
or went underground. What was significant is that from the
early fifties and onward was the birth of various Islamic
movements and organizations all aimed for Islamic revival and
unity among its Muslim peoples. They were the “moderate” form
of Islam that sought reforms within the existing political
systems. Among them were the Nadhatul Ulama of Indonesia and
the Philippine Muslim Association in the Philippines.
The scenario changed in the late sixties on account of
the upheavals in the Middle East particularly the war of
national liberation by the People of Palestine, the Vietnam
War and the civil war in Afghanistan. Local national Islamic
movements started to have overly of Islamic “irredentism”.
While the former was originally aimed at national reform, the
latter is aimed at changing the “World Order” as protest
against western imperial dominance and corruption by leaders
under existing Muslim regimes.
In the Philippines, the
infamous “Jabbidah Massacre” became the pivotal point in the
rise of Muslim militancy. (24) On May 1, 1968, the late
Governor Datu Udtog Matalam issued the historic Manifesto
calling for the organization of the Republic of Mindanao and
Sulu.(25) During the declaration of Martial Law by former
dictator Marcos the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
became the dominant force seeking for an independent Bangsa
Moro Homeland. After Nur Misuari, Chairman of the MNLF signed
the Tripoli Agreement with the Philippine government on
December 23, 1976, the late Professor Salamat Hashim due to
some differences with the former broke away from the MNLF and
continued to pursue the Moro cause for an independent Bangsa
Moro state. On September 2, 1996, the MNLF signed the Final
Peace Agreement with the Philippine government.(26) The full
implementation of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement of 1996
is still a hanging issue in the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC). Meantime the Arroyo government has an
on-going peace negotiation with the MILF.
The
September 11, 2001 attack on the New York Trade Center has
transformed the ASEAN region as the second front for the US
led war against terrorism. The issue of terrorism has now
become a high priority agenda among ASEAN countries. To date,
however, there is still no clear agreement among the ASEAN
member states on the precise definition of terrorism. Ten
ASEAN members during a two-day meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2001
have agreed to disagree on what constitute terrorism. Instead,
they focused on forming a united anti-terror front and pledged
to set up a strong regional security framework agreement.(27)
The campaign against terrorism in the ASEAN region is
hampered by the lack of a precise definition of what
constitute “terrorism” as a transnational crime. The
Philippines and the rest of the ASEAN countries are still in
the stage of drafting anti-terror laws. In the proposed
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1995, “Terrorism” is defined as “the use
of violence, threat or intimidation or destructive of lives or
properties with the objective of creating fear in the public
mind to achieve a purported political end and to coerce or
influence their behavior to undermine the confidence of the
general public on the government.”
In the Agreement on
Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication
Procedures signed in May 2002 between the Philippines,
Malaysia and Indonesia, terrorism is defined as “any act of
violence or threat thereof perpetrated to carry out within the
respective territories of the parties or in the border area of
any of the Parties by an individual or collective criminal
plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm
them or imperiling their lives, honour, freedom, security or
rights or exposing the environment of any facility or public
private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them or
endangering a natural resource, or international facilities,
or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political
unity or sovereignty of Independent States.” (28)
The
above definitions suffer serious flaws. It run counter to the
Geneva Declaration on Terrorism of 1987 “which undertook an
effort towards a comprehensive definition including acts by
states, groups and individuals on the international as well as
on the national level.” (29) The definition has also
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