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Hans Köchler Professor of Philosophy, Chair for Political Philosophy and Philosophical Anthropology, University of Innsbruck, Austria Co-Chair, International Academy for Philosophy President of the International Progress Organization |
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Unity
in Diversity:
Keynote lecture delivered at the opening session of the First International Conference on Contemporary Philosophy of Religion
jointly organized by the Iranian Association for the Philosophy of Religion Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies Tehran, Iran, 23 December 2012 |
I.P.O. Online Publications International Progress Organization, A-1010 Vienna, Kohlmarkt 4, Austria © International Progress Organization, 2012 |
(I)
Never
before in the history of mankind has there existed a situation where a
multitude of civilizations and religions has coexisted – or has had to live
together – in a more direct and immediate form than in our era of
globalization. This constellation may be characterized as a “simultaneity”
of different metaphysical conceptions and their related value systems under
the conditions of a “life-world” that is determined by technology and its
most salient feature at the beginning of the 21st century, the
digital information and communication techniques. In earlier eras, a
community could retreat into its own “domain” and shield itself from outside
influences. This option, not to interact, is not anymore available.
Through recorded history, religious differences
have all too often been causes of conflict between communities of believers
and/or the political entities (states) in which they were organized. People
have eagerly tried, and invested a lot of intellectual and emotional energy,
to define the differences that distinguish them from others in order to
shape and assert their cultural and religious identity. Drawing the
borderlines between “us” and “them” – the dialectics of cultural
self-assertion – has been part and parcel of identity politics from
antiquity until the present day (to the point that even within communities,
sub-groups have zealously striven to distinguish themselves from one
another). Inter- and intra-religious conflicts, albeit often fuelled by
socio-economic interests, constitute an important share of the history of
civilizations. Since Samuel Huntington introduced the assumption of an
incompatibility between different religious worldviews after the supposed
end of ideological rivalry in the 1990s, the paradigm of the “clash of
civilizations”[1]
has indeed become a buzzword in contemporary discourses on world order, and
in the debates that emphasize the cultural heritage of the Western world
vis-à-vis other traditions in particular.
The simultaneity of distinct civilizational and
religious life-worlds and value systems under the conditions of our “global
village” – which, for each and every community, means proximity and
interdependence to an ever higher degree – has given new and increasing
relevance to the philosophy of religion, well beyond the traditional
epistemological and metaphysical domains. In the context of globalization,
the plurality of religious faiths has become a fact that determines
every-day life also in the increasingly multicultural societies of the
industrialized world; it has indeed become an inescapable social reality. To
“manage” cultural and religious differences in a rational manner (in the
true sense of what the Greeks called λόγος) is now an imperative of peace,
at the local as well as at the global level.
Acknowledging a plurality of religions – i. e. a
multitude of belief systems and their related ontological and normative
concepts, as well as analyzing their structural content, does in no way
imply a defense of relativism. A clear distinction has to be made between a
relativist position (which claims the existence of a multitude of mutually
exclusive truths, or entirely rejects the very notion of truth) and that of
perspectivism in the Kantian sense. (It is to be noted that Kant’s
transcendental epistemology strictly distinguishes between phenomenon and
reality as such [Ding an sich] and that his critique of the “Gottesbeweise,”
the classical philosophical arguments for the existence of God, only relates
to the phenomenal
[empirical]
realm, but does not exclude another, genuine, access to the awareness of the
νούμενον, the transcendent and absolute Being, in the domain of morality).
Religious pluralism is also not to be confused either with a reductionist
approach that derives religious dogma from historical or socio-cultural
factors, subordinating it to the empirical realm, or with forms of religious
syncretism.
To describe the compatibility of a plurality of
faiths with the universality of truth one might also refer to John Hick’s
cosmological metaphor that juxtaposes the Copernican versus the Ptolemaic
model: while the latter is compared with a theological view that asserts the
exclusive position of one particular religion, to the detriment of
all other religions, the former symbolizes the fact that all theistic belief
systems actually reveal different aspects of one and the same reality of the
true God, merely taking different paths to achieve the same goal (in a way
that is similar to the planets’ revolving around the same star – which keeps
them in their unique place, but along different trajectories).[2]
Others have demonstrated, in the context of the Islamic tradition, that
pluralism of religions, properly understood, does neither imply relativism
nor undermine a particular religious identity. This is obvious in the
notions of “non-reductive religious pluralism”[3]
or of “pluralistic religion” in the sense of a “pluralism in truthfulness,”
which preserves the “ultimate uniqueness” of religion.[4]
One could also illustrate this aspect of “unity in diversity” by reference
to a frequently quoted dictum from a story of Jalaluddin Rumi (“Moses and
the Shepherd”) where God reminds Moses of the respect for the variety of
individual religious experience and that experience’s expression in a
person’s life-world and language: “I have given to every person a
(particular) nature and temperament, (and) I have given to every person a
(particular) form of speech and idiomatic expression. (…) We do not regard
the tongue and (outward) speech, (but) We regard the soul and the (inward)
state.”[5]
It is certainly legitimate to describe the actual
multitude of belief systems empirically and in their sociological,
psychological and historical dimensions, but only a deeper
phenomenological approach will help us to understand the religious
experience as a comprehension of the world sui generis, and to grasp its
inherent metaphysical truth – in a manner that allows us to reach a deeper
understanding of ourselves in the context of the κόσμος. Theologia
naturalis – “natural theology” in the sense of the philosophical
question as to the existence of God and his nature and attributes – has been
an essential part of metaphysics (namely of metaphysica specialis)
since ancient times. The philosophical analysis of the ontological issues
that relate to the question of the transcendent and the absolute, in fact of
the characteristics of Being as such, has been an intrinsic part of
philosophia perennis, and in different religious contexts such as those
of Islam and Christianity. The classical Aristotelian notion of the supreme
being as the
πρῶτον κινοῦν
ἀκίνητον (“the first unmoved mover”) has informed metaphysical
thinking in different religions and civilizational contexts.
General ontological concepts – that transcend
cultural differences – allow the philosopher to undertake a structural
comparison between distinct systems of faith and their metaphysical notions,
and, subsequently, help the believer to better define, and defend, his own
position. In that regard, the ontology of Mulla Sadra, his notion of “being”
in distinction from “essence,” and his understanding of God in the sense of
“unity and simplicity in the realm of Being,” as described in Muhammad
Kamal’s interpretation,[6]
is of particular interest to the philosopher of religion, and especially to
those who seek a more comprehensive understanding of the connection between
the fundamental question of ontology and the supreme truth of monotheistic
religion.
A logical point could also be made in this
ontological context, namely in regard to the ultimate truth that is
expressed in and conveyed though the three monotheistic religions: if there
exists only one god, that God must be one and the same. There cannot
be three different “gods” for Jews, Christians and Muslims – only three
different perceptions of God or manifestations of truth in
the context of the respective revelation.[7]
Awareness of this logically obvious, but nonetheless often neglected, truth
could be an important contribution also to religious, or societal, peace in
a wider sense. It is in this context that the late Cardinal Franz König,
Archbishop of Vienna, emphasized that “particularly today a discussion
between Islam and Christianity on monotheism has a beneficial function and
should contribute towards the reduction of suspicion, towards the
understanding of the peoples of the world and the peaceful coexistence of
nations.”[8]
It is in the analysis of the different traditions
and distinct perceptions of being where hermeneutics comes into play, a
discipline that anyway has its origin in the interpretation of the sacred
scriptures, including scriptural exegesis in Islam, long before it was
identified as a special discipline in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s philosophy
of religion. In different cultural contexts and life-worlds, philosophers
have described the religious perceptions and interpretations of the world,
and the truth contained in them, in the general conceptual framework of
metaphysics and in particular of ontology as part of metaphysica
generalis. They have also undertaken a structural analysis and
comparison of different systems of faith. In this sense, philosophical
reflection may provide a kind of “fundamental hermeneutics” of religious
experience, which, in turn, is an essential precondition for, or element of,
dialogue between distinct traditions. This will potentially assist
the believer in achieving a deeper understanding of his own religious
identity, a point I have made – if I may be allowed to reminisce for a
moment – at the first international conference on “The Concept of Monotheism
in Islam and Christianity,” which I organized in Rome back in 1981. I had
then characterized the aim of this undertaking – namely an analysis of the
central metaphysical notion of these two religions – as to “deepen one’s own
self-comprehension through the encounter with and the respect for other
religious and cultural traditions.”[9]
To elucidate the importance of philosophical
hermeneutics for a better understanding of the religious message, and the
eternal truth contained in it, we also may refer here to the view of Rudolf
Bultmann, one of the leading Christian theologians of the 20th
century, for whom the religious message needed to be interpreted in the
conceptual framework of those who actually listen to it and aim to abide by
its imperatives. His description could be seen as a kind of modern “mission
statement” for the philosophy of religion that gives a new, and positive,
meaning to the medieval characterization of philosophy as ancilla
theologiae (that had effectively relegated philosophy to an auxiliary
discipline and subordinated it to the authority of the Christian Church):
“Theology has no more urgent task than that of learning the basic philosophy
of its time, for it is this philosophy which has the critical task of
analysis and conceptual translation (…) Philosophy performs for theology its
old service as the ‘handmaid of theology.’”[10]
In regard to the interpretation of the eternal message of his own Christian
faith, Bultmann emphasized that “Christian history is filled with examples
of transient cultural symbols used to utter Christian self-understanding.”[11]
One could also refer here to Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy and his
analysis of the “religious symbol.”[12]
(II)
It is, thus, incumbent upon us to reflect on the
possibility and role of a “philosophy of religion” under the conditions of
the 21st century.
In his lecture course of 1921/1922 on
Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (Phenomenology of religious life),
Martin Heidegger said: “Genuine philosophy of religion does not emerge from
preconceived notions of philosophy and religion. Rather a specific
religiosity (…) provides the possibility for its philosophical
comprehension.”[13]
This essentially phenomenological approach means that it is not mere
abstract speculation, but authentic religious experience, in a given
historical and socio-cultural context, which provides the foundation of
philosophy of religion. “History can only be conceived on the basis of the
present situation,” Heidegger continues, “and only in this way can the
possibility of a philosophy of religion be grasped.”[14]
From the outset, this implies a multitude of points of departure for the
philosophical reflection on religion, and it excludes a narrow Eurocentric
approach.
It is obvious, but must be stressed nonetheless,
that “philosophy of religion” is not identical with “religious philosophy.”
The philosophical approach per se is neutral vis-à-vis a particular faith;
it embodies the universality of the mind – without prejudice
to the individual religious commitment of the philosopher. A widely used
term such as “Christian philosophy,” to give just one example that
illustrates this semantical issue, only relates to the philosophical ideas
developed by thinkers who, as individuals, belong to the Christian faith; it
does not mean that the specific notions or theories expounded by them as
such are “Christian.”[15]
No one can claim the λόγος (reason or, in a modern context, rationality) as
a privilege of his religion, thus excluding believers of other faiths from
the “community of communication” (Kommunikationsgemeinschaft in the sense of
Habermas) and denying them the status of equal partners in philosophical
dialogue about metaphysical truth. This is the point where I beg to differ
with the famous Regensburg lecture of September 2006 entitled “Faith, Reason
and the University” that was characterized by an apologetic approach along
those lines.[16]
Any exclusivist approach is intrinsically alien to the
philosophical mind and undertaking – in whichever historical or
socio-cultural environment. In structural terms, this also applies to the
kind of “inclusivism,” namely his notion of the “anonymous Christian,” by
which the late Karl Rahner – whom I had invited to Innsbruck in November
1970 for a lecture on “Theology in Interdisciplinary Dialogue” – had tried
to grasp the intricacies of inter-religious relations in the era of the
Second Vatican Council.[17]
It was certainly not an easy task to reconcile Catholic self-comprehension
as expressed in the dictum extra Ecclesiam nulla salus (“outside
the Church there is no salvation”) with the requirements of intra-religious
(i.e. inter-Christian) dialogue at the time, not to speak of relations with
non-Christian religions.
Endowed with the capacity of self-reflection, the
human being has always striven for the ultimate truth and meaning of life.
The search for the transcendent has united thinkers of all civilizations
throughout the ages. This genuinely philosophical quest is based on
experience and reason in a comprehensive sense (and not only in the meaning
of European Enlightenment). Through its universal outlook, and transcending
cultural differences, philosophy has indeed created a common space
of reflection on the existence of the absolute. This is the essence
and basis of the mission of philosophy of religion also in the
present age – in spite of all the challenges posed by the exclusivist and
exclusionary as well as the relativist paradigms, or the relegation of
religious experience to the psychological and sociological domains.
It is here where the question of the specific
meaning of dialogue between different religions, and the
civilizations associated with them, comes into play. We cannot avoid posing
the one fundamental question: In what sense may one speak of “dialogue” if
one bears in mind that each religion represents the ultimate truth in the
form that is unique to its socio-cultural environment and the
circumstances of its revelation? In view of this uniqueness, one may
conceptually distinguish between co-existence, implying mutual
respect, between different religions with their specific manifestations of
truth on the one hand, and dialogue among those who analyze the
underlying metaphysical notions on the other. “Dialogue” is thus the
appropriate category for the efforts of those who engage in the
philosophy of religion, who analyze the distinct forms of revelation of
the absolute, and its categorizations, and who undertake to relate the basic
elements of each system of faith to the other. Hermeneutical analysis and
structural comparison between ontological concepts is the field where a
dialogical approach – in clear distinction from an apologetic one – is
conceptually appropriate and theologically legitimate.
I would like to conclude by referring again to the
anthropological constant that is at the roots of religion as well as
philosophy: The quest of the absolute is an intrinsic
characteristic of man. While, in the religious domain, this effort is
pursued on the basis of revelation and faith, the philosophical method is
solely dependent on (human) reason. These two distinct approaches are not
contradictory, but complementary. Without imposing itself on the
original domain of faith, philosophy – through an analysis of the common
structure of religious experience – may assist the believer to overcome
a merely apologetic approach, and to reach out to the truth revealed in
other religions. Dialogue between religions – or, more specifically, between those who undertake a philosophical analysis of religion – may, thus, contribute to a deeper awareness of the common foundation of our life-world and can give metaphysical depth to today’s technological civilization that, in its globalized version, risks to forget its metaphysical roots. Philosophy of religion may help us to become aware that rational analysis of being is not the privileged domain of a particular civilization, rooted in a specific religious worldview, but the common heritage of man on the basis of which we can better understand and appreciate each other’s religious identity. This is the spirit of “unity in diversity” that can be seen as the quintessential element of “global religion” in our time; and therein lies the essentially dialogical nature of the philosophy of religion. Under these circumstances, philosophy can indeed make a tangible contribution to peaceful co-existence among religions – as cornerstone of a sustainable order of peace and justice among nations in the 21st century. *****
[1] The notion
was first introduced by Bernard
Lewis into
contemporary discourse. See his “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” in:
The Atlantic Monthly,
Vol. 266, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 47–60. [2] John Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths. Oxford: One World Publications, 1973. See also his book More than One Way? Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1995.
[3] Muhammad
Legenhausen, A Muslim’s Proposal: Non-Reductive Religious
Pluralism. Online paper, 25 January 2006, at
http://www.uibk.ac.at/theol/leseraum/texte/626.html. See also his
work Islam and Religious Pluralism. London: Al-Hoda, 1999.
[4]
Seyed Hassan Hosseini, “Religious Pluralism and Pluralistic
Religion: John Hick’s Epistemological Foundation of Religious
Pluralism and an Explanation of Islamic Epistemology toward
Diversity of Unique Religion,” in: The Pluralist, Vol. 5,
No. 1 (Spring 2010), pp. 94-109.
[5]
“Moses and the Shepherd” (part two), Mathnawi II: 1750-1764:
“The reprimanding by God Most High of Moses – peace be upon him –
for the shepherd’s sake.” Trans. from the Persian by Ibrahim Gamard,
at http://www.dar-al-masnavi.org/n.a-II-1750.html, accessed on 21
Dec. 2012. [6] Muhammad Kamal, Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy. (Ashgate World Philosophies Series.) Aldershot (UK) / Burlington (USA): Ashgate, 2006, p. 58.
[7]
On the notion of
“God” see also Narjes Javandel Soumeahsaraei, “On Believing in the
Same God: A Semantic Analysis,” in: Christian Kanzian and Muhammad
Legenhausen (eds.), Proofs for the Existence of God: Contexts –
Structures – Relevance. Innsbruck: IUP – Innsbruck University
Press, 2008, pp. 113-126. [8] Hans Köchler (ed.), The Concept of Monotheism in Islam and Christianity. Vienna: Braumüller, 1982, p. 3. [9] Op. cit., p. 1.
[10]
Rudolf Bultmann,
“Vom Begriff der religiösen Gemeinschaft: Zu Ernst Lohmeyers
gleichnamigem Buch,” in: Theologische Blätter, Vol. 6
(1927), col. 73. (Trans. From German by Joseph P. Cahill.)
[11] Review of
Hans
Lietzmann, “Geschichte der alten Kirche,” in: Zeitschrift für
Kirchengeschichte, Vol. 58 (1939), p. 262. See also Rudolf
Bultmann, “Zur Frage der Christologie,” in: Glauben und Verstehen.
(Gesammelte Aufsätze, Vol. 1.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1933, pp. 85-113. [12] Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil. New York: Harper & Row, 1967, pp. 15ff.
[13]
“Die echte Religionsphilosophie entspringt nicht vorgefaßten
Begriffen von Philosophie und Religion. Sondern aus einer bestimmten
Religiosität (…) ergibt sich die Möglichkeit ihrer philosophischen
Erfassung.” (Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie des religiösen
Lebens. Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 60. Frankfurt a. M.:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1995, p. 124.) [14] Op. cit., p. 125. [15] On this see also Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 3rd ed. 1966, p. 6.
[16]
Hans Köchler,
“Religion, Reason and
Violence: Pope Benedict XVI and Islam,” in:
Future Islam,
New Delhi, September/October 2006, www.futureislam.com.
[17] Cf. K.
Riesenhuber, “Der anonyme Christ nach Karl Rahner,” in:
Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Vol. 86 (1964), pp.
286-303. |
Hans Köchler’s initiatives and writings on civilizational dialogue: |