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Prof. Dr. Hans Köchler Co-President, International Academy for Philosophy Professor em. of Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, Austria President of the International Progress Organization |
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Philosophy and Democratic Prejudice
International Conference Devoted to Academician Georg Brutian's 90th Anniversary
“Life
and Philosophy”
co-organized by
Yerevan, 22 November 2016 |
I.P.O. Online Publications International Progress Organization, A-1010 Vienna, Kohlmarkt 4, Austria © International Progress Organization, 2017. All rights reserved. |
Distinguished Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of
Armenia, Distinguished President of the National Academy of Sciences, Distinguished Rector of Armenian State Pedagogical University, Dear colleagues!
(I) Preliminary Remarks
Since men have organized themselves in polities, overcoming the
state of nature, power has chosen to resort to principles
to legitimize itself. Innumerable wars have been conducted in
the name of noble goals, entire nations have been destroyed in
the name of these goals. The prevailing power subsequently ruled
by invoking its supposedly noble mission in the defence of
humanity – albeit, in actual fact, the driving motive may have
been what is nowadays referred to as the “national interest,” a
conglomerate of collective volitions, but certainly not a system
of values that would transcend the actual will to power.
While, in earlier centuries, it has often been the role of
religion (i.e. religious values) to justify the use of force
and a polity’s – or ruler’s – claim to power, in the modern
world religious beliefs have been replaced by the doctrine of
democracy and, as its foundation, human rights. Since
the late 20th century, many wars have been fought in
the name of democracy and the fundamental rights of the citizen.
The doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” – or “Responsibility
to Protect” (R2P) – is clear evidence of this trend that gained
strength since the end of the cold war in particular.[1]
Régimes have been “changed” and entire regions were destabilized
as result of such actions – with the consequence of perpetual
conflict (instead of “Perpetual Peace” as envisaged by Immanuel
Kant in his outline of a “republican” world order)[2]
and the re-emergence of totalitarian systems of which the
“Islamic State” is the most frightening phenomenon.[3] It
thus appears appropriate for philosophy to analyze and
deconstruct one of the fundamental concepts in the name of which
the global claim to power is legitimized in the post-cold war
era. It is to be hoped that such an effort will contribute to
more cautious and prudent action of state leaders and will make
it more difficult to legitimize, and get support for, war at the
international level.
(II)
Terminology A.
The notion of democracy
What is referred to as “democracy” in contemporary discourse is,
in actual fact, and in most cases, a system of rule on
behalf of the people, not by the people. This is in
strict conceptual contradiction to the original Greek notion of
δημο-κρατία. It is
a commonly held view that, unlike in ancient times, in our
modern, post-Enlightenment era, the δῆμος
(people) is not a distinct group of privileged persons,
excluding all others, but the community of all inhabitants (with
the exception of foreigners) as citizens. In reality, however,
“democracy” is essentially defined as parliamentary rule,
i.e. as the exercise of power by a select group of individuals
over the δῆμος.
Popular rule in the original sense – by way of referendum – is,
if at all, only admitted as exception.
Against this background, the terminology established in
political science is rather misleading. The distinction between
“direct” and “indirect” democracy creates the impression as if
the democratic paradigm – originally postulated in the ancient
Athenian polity – was compatible with action by proxy. “Rule” is
either direct (genuine) or it does not exist at all. This was
more clearly understood in the context of Kantian practical
philosophy (in view of his notion of autonomy)[4]
or, more specifically, in Rousseau’s doctrine of democracy: “La
volonté ne se représente point: elle est
la même, ou elle est autre; il n'y a point de milieu.”[5]
The will of the people cannot be represented (i.e. exercised by
others on behalf of the citizen); in such a case, it ceases to
exist. This also implies that the modern term participatory
(or: direct) democracy is actually a pleonasm,
wrongly making people believe that there can be genuine
practices of democracy other than those of direct agency of each
and every individual as citizen.[6]
This “democratic prejudice,” which has shaped contemporary
politics at the global level, must be carefully scrutinized – if
we are indeed committed to preserving the spirit of democracy,
i.e. the democratic ideal. This is the legitimate role of
the philosophy of politics – a form of “Ideologiekritik”
that keeps distance from actual practice, critically reflects
political stereotypes and, thus, is able – and has the courage –
to “speak truth to power.”
What is commonly referred to as “democracy” is, in most cases, a
system of representation for which the more appropriate
Greek term would be
ὀλιγαρχία (oligarchy) – which, however, lacks the
legitimizing power of the prevalent term. B.
The notion of representation In
modern political discourse, the dominant doctrine is that of
representation. According to its rarely questioned
assumption, “democracy” – as explained above – means the power
to decide on behalf of the people (citizens), not
the people’s power to decide. In this system, the political
competence is vested in specially authorized office-holders
(such as president, member of parliament, etc., depending on the
respective constitutional provisions) who are understood to
re-present (literally: “make again present”) the totality
of the people[7]
and who exercise their authority by way of a “free” mandate,
i.e. not bound by the will of others, including the electorate,
but only by the dictates of their conscience – with the supposed
aim to serve the common good as they – the
representatives – understand it.
However, “democracy by representation” is based on fictitious
premises that must be identified as such if one wants to
understand the nature of most of our contemporary political
systems. Those fictitious assumptions are:
1.
That there exists a totality of the people as an ideal
entity (ontological fiction in the Platonic sense, or a
version of false idealism in the sphere of the collective);
2.
that the representative is capable to act like an “ethereal
being,” without any consideration as to his/her personal
interests and motivations (while, in reality, and in most cases,
every deputy in parliament acts on party orders) (psychological
fiction, stipulating an ideal person supposed to be able to
act altruistically in an absolute sense);
3.
that the will of the citizens, the source of any
legitimate democratic order, can at all be represented by an
individual or a group of individuals (i.e. that it can be
made present as act of volition and source of the law) (normative
fiction). The latter is a double fiction in the strict
sense, implying (a) that there exists something like a
“collective will” as an entity that can be represented, and (b)
that this will can be exercised by an individual on behalf of
all.[8] If
connected to the doctrine of representation, the notion of
popular sovereignty – as foundation of state sovereignty in
the international realm[9]
– also becomes fictitious, a point which Hans Kelsen, the author
of the Austrian Republic’s first constitution after World War I,
has also made clear.[10]
(III) Quid nunc? -- Political conclusions from philosophical disillusionment
What follows from this deconstruction – to use a
fashionable term – of the democratic prejudice? Is it more than
a futile exercise in Ideologiekritik, an abstract,
non-consequential conceptual analysis? Under conditions of the
so-called New World Order – i.e. the system of power relations
after the collapse of the cold war’s bipolar balance of power[11] – a more
precise use of terms will have multiple benefits for any polity
that aspires to be “democratic”:
(a)
Conceptual clarification will help the public – the citizens –
to avoid confusion over their actual status. Being able
to precisely identify the factors of decision-making will enable
the citizens to act rationally vis-à-vis their
“representatives” instead of fatefully accepting their
decisions.
(b)
A
precise terminology, not confusing democracy with oligarchy or
autocracy, will make it more difficult for the holders of power
to immunize their exercise of authority – because they
will have to face a more mature citizenry. In this sense,
precision is a kind of antidote to the abuses of power.
(c)
Internationally, it will be more difficult to instrumentalize
“democracy” to justify the use of force (as happened, for
instance, in the cases of Iraq 2003 or Libya 2011) if an
informed public understands that what is invoked in the
justification of such interventions is not the right of
each citizen to decide, but a kind of élite rule that is
meant to serve the interests of the intervening power and,
actually and more specifically, the lobbies and interest groups
of that country.
While, under the ideological cover of representation and the
free mandate, the real motives and interests of the political
actors can be conveniently hidden, terminological precision and
honesty about the exercise of power have a profoundly
de-legitimizing effect – domestically as well as
internationally, and may, in the longer term, contribute to what
is often described as democratization of society and state
– and, subsequently, of the system of relations between states.
A more honest discourse
on democracy, in the sense of not equating “representation” with
“democracy” – or power with subordination to power, may also
help to achieve a synthesis between idea and reality
of politics – or between old-fashioned, but stubbornly
persisting, realpolitik and the ideal of equality
of states (“sovereign equality” as enshrined in the United
Nations Charter)[12]
at the global level. Idea and reality of politicsIn
the ideal world, freedom and the inalienable dignity of
the human being mean that he/she should be able to take part in
public life and jointly conduct the affairs of the community
directly, without any intermediaries, and at an equal
level. However, in the real – ever more complex –
world of the collective organization of the will of human beings
in states, large or small, the individual (out of organizational
necessity) will have to delegate his/her authority to
specially designated office-holders, a process which – if there
are no corrective mechanisms such as referenda – is tantamount
to his/her abdication as citizen.[13] In that
regard, it may be of interest to study the Swiss political
practice, which can be characterized as a kind of fusion of
idealist and realist approaches in the organization
of the popular will.[14] By
using the proper terms in the description of the decision-making
processes, we can avoid creating expectations that cannot be
fulfilled and will unavoidably lead to political
disillusionment. “Democratic fatigue” – a phenomenon ever
more widespread also in the industrialized world[15]
– can best be countered by civic honesty, i.e. if we identify as
“democratic” only those practices (i.e. forms of
decision-making) where the individual can meaningfully
participate in public life. The overcoming of “democratic
prejudice” – along the philosophical considerations briefly
outlined here – will be the precondition for setting one’s “democratic
expectations” at a realistic and philosophically sound
level. Critique of a false idealism, indeed an idealistic
fiction, of the community will be more conducive to a stable
order of peace, domestically as well as internationally, than an
attitude based on illusions and – ultimately – false
expectations.
***
[1]
For details see the author’s analysis, The Concept of
Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power
Politics: Is the Revival of the Doctrine of "Just War"
Compatible with the International Rule of Law?
(Studies in International Relations, Vol. XXVI.) Vienna:
International Progress Organization, 2001.
[2]
Immanuel Kant,
Zum
ewigen
Frieden.
Ed. Otfried
Höffe. Berlin:
Akademie, 1995.
[3]
Thus, in the early 21st century, we are again
witnessing a return of religion, by way of reaction, as
legitimizing factor in the realm of politics.
[4]
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. New
York: Macmillan, 1989, Book I, Chapter 1, § 8. See also,
inter alia, Kant, Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals and, What Is Enlightenment?
New York: Macmillan, 1989, p. 65.
[5]
Du Contrat Social ou principes du droit politique
(1762), III, 15
(1762, quoted according to Oeuvres choisies.
Paris: Classiques Garnier, 1954.
[6]
For details see also Hans Köchler, “Demokratie –
Parlamentarismus – Menschenrechte. Philosophische
Überlegungen zum 'demokratischen Vorurteil',”
in: G. Prabitz and W. Schopper (eds.), Uni
2000.
Zukunftsperspektiven universitärer Forschung und Lehre
am Beispiel der Universität Innsbruck.
Innsbruck: Haymon, 1990, pp. 51-61. [7] Cf. the analysis of Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (1928). Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1954.
[8]
On the fictitious character of representation see the
author’s analysis, “Demokratietheorien im Schnittpunkt
von Verfassung und politischer Wirklichkeit,“ in: A.
Pelinka and H. Reinalter (eds.), Interdisziplinäre
Demokratieforschung.
(Series "Vergleichende Gesellschaftsgeschichte und
politische Ideengeschichte der Neuzeit," Vol. 11.)
Vienna: Braumüller, 1998, pp. 117-128.
[9]
On the conceptual connection between sovereignty and
democracy see the author’s lecture,
“Sovereignty,
Law and Democracy versus Power Politics,”
in:
Current Concerns,
No. 34, Zurich, 22 November 2013, Supplement, pp. 18-25.
[10]
Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie.
Aalen:
Scientia Verlag, 1963 (reprint 2nd ed.), esp. pp. 30ff.
[11]
For details see, inter alia, Hans Köchler,
Democracy and the New World Order. (Studies in
International Relations, Vol. XIX.) Vienna:
International Progress Organization, 1993.
[12]
Article 2, Par. 1. [13] On the incompatibility of the democratic principle with representation see also, Robert Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie: Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens. Leipzig: Dr. Werner Klinkhardt, 1911, pp. 36ff.
[14]
Hanspeter Kriesi, Direct Democratic
Choice: The Swiss
Experience.
Lanham/Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2005.
[15] See e.g. Carlo Mongardini, “Crisis and Transformation of Political Representation in Western Europe,” in: Hans Köchler (ed.), The Crisis of Representative Democracy. Frankfurt a.M./Bern/New York: Peter Lang, 1987, pp. 115-125.
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