Classifying Terrorism

By Philipp A. Thomas and Tony Standley
Department of Law, University College Cardiff, United Kingdom

Published in:
Hans Koechler (ed.), TERRORISM AND NATIONAL LIBERATION.
Proceedings of the International Conference on the Question of Terrorism.
Studies in International Relations, XIII.
Frankfurt a.M., Bern, New York: Peter Lang, 1988, pp. 67-78.
ISBN 3-8204-1217-4

             The aphorism „one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter“ has acquired the status of cliché precisely because it conveys so neatly the core of the definitional problem of „terrorism.“ Terrorism is an emotive and value ladden word for all that it is invariably used and projected as an unquestionably objective term. Those who assert  that this aphorism is no more than an expression of unacceptable moral relativism are, in effect, claiming an exclusive moral rectitude for their own views and, by direct implication, moral superiority for themselves. History tends to deal harshly with such claims.

 That there is a definitional problem with the term „terrorism“ is witnessed by the proportion of writers on the subject who feel obliged to discuss the matter – and to offer their own definitions – and by the failure of the United Nations to agree a definition despite stating for fifteen years that it is essential to do so.

 There are several dimensions to the definitional problem. Firstly, „terrorism“ is an item of political discourse, and as such is often employed for political effect, in the same way as the terms „democracy,“ „Rule of Law,“ and „freedom“ are employed in the political arena. In this fashion „terrorism“ has the function of a crude pejorative calculated to instill hostility and fear. Secondly, commentators may eschew overtly political usages. They may perhaps recognise a question of value‑neutrality but nevertheless find it impossible to escape from positions profoundly influenced by their political and cultural environments. This raises the third and more general dimension. It is the matter of whether it is possible to attain objectivity in the sense of arriving at an absolute, universal truth or criterion. Schmid’s view that „the best we can hope for is a definition which is acceptable to social science analysts, leaving the political definition to the parties involved in terrorism and anti‑terrorism“ (A.P. Schmid, “Political Terrorism – a research guide,” 1984, p. 6) could be understood as affirming the possibility of objective analysis and definition by social scientists. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as arguing for the more modest goal of consensual definition amongst social scientists. In either case it seems taken for granted that social scientists can transcend the subjectivities of „the parties concerned,“ which ought to be reason enough for not leaving to them „the political definition.“ Finally, it should be remembered that the terms and language used within the definitions of terrorism may themselves be contentious.

 Classification, understood as typology, is closely related to definition, as the Aristotelian formula of „genus“ and „differentia specifica“ makes clear. Any definition, whether it takes this classic logical form or consists of a listing of characteristic attributes or synonyms, is intended to isolate and to demarcate the boundaries of its subject matter. But classification means not only typolo­gy but also the act of classifying. It is this and its consequences, which will be the particular concern of this paper, after a survey of the problem areas out­lined above.

 POLITICS, CULTURE AND TERRORISM

 During the 1914-1918 war, the British public was informed that German sol­diers mutilated babies and raped nuns, in addition to their more demonstrable violation of Belgian neutrality. (A.J.P. Taylor, “English History 1914-1945,” 1970, p.46). Tales of atrocities against women and children are endemic in such times, and the German public was encouraged to believe that they would be no safer in the hands of British soldiers. It is the enemy who constantly threaten or commit atrocities. It is they who are the enemy of civilisation. States need external enemies and invariably they can be found or created.

 „… the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing against sedition, rebellion and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity with one another and, to this end, to find an enemy against who they can make common cause.“ (Jean Bodin, “Six Books of the Republic,” quoted in B. Stacey, “Political Socialisation in Western Society,” 1978, p.  44.)

 The current common enemy for Western states is the terrorist „not only be­cause they absorb the brunt of the attacks, but because their political philo­sophy is anathema to the terrorists.“ (B. Netanyahu, “Terrorism – How the West Can Win,” 1986, p. 3, and cf. P. Wilkinson, “Terrorism and the Liberal State,” 1977.) The first of the two suppositions here can be considered accurate if and only if „terrorism“ is so defined as to exclude a number of apparently similar acts. These would include: I. those committed by, or on behalf of, Western states; II. those committed by regimes against their own subjects; and most generally III. those committed in Lands geographically or economically distant enough to ignore, provided, of course, that Western citizens or proper­ty are not imperilled. The second supposition, a contrast of political philoso­phies, implies either that all terrorism is part of a monolithic conspiracy against liberal democracies or that all terrorist groups have philosophies, which invariably include a common element hostile to Western styles of government. President Ronald Reagan appears to believe in a network of „terrorist“ and „outlaw“ states which are „united by the simple, criminal phenomenon – their fanatical hatred of the United States, our people, our way of life, our interna­tional stature.“ (Speech to the American Bar Association, 9 July 1985, cited in Segaller, “Invisible Armies,” 1986, p.130)

 This process of political demonology has a number of potential functions in both domestic and international politics: for example, it promotes the stigmatisation of the enemy as sub-human and barbarous. Since no argued grounds are given for hating the United States of America or anathematising the West’s political philosophy, the audience is encouraged to deduce that the terrorist is irrational – a conclusion which is heavily promoted by selective use of such words as „fanatic.“ As an attempt to reason with the irrational is pointless a further conclusion is invited. This is that as logic and reason, by definition, must fail then the only response which the terrorist will understand is the use of force. The effect of this exercise is to polarise issues and, by so doing, to eliminate any possible middle ground so that the state’s citizens and its allies must make a very simple choice: either to support the wholly good, i.e. the state, or the wholly bad, i.e., the terrorist. Ambivalence or attempts to con­struct alternative positions are castigated and categorised as supporting the state’s enemies.

Within the polity this process can be appropriated by one political party or faction in order to assert its moral supremacy over the political competition. It presents itself as the law and order party, inviting „right thinking“ people to support it not only against terrorism but also against those parties which are „soft“ on terrorism. Emphasising the issue by continual reference to the terrorist threat can increase the political capital. Thus, West German conser­vatives have suggested a connection between the Socialist Party (SPD), stu­dent and industrial militancy, infernal and external terrorism and the perennial „Communist threat.“ (G. Pridham, “Terrorism and the State in West Germany during the 1970’s,” in Lodge [ed.], “Terrorism: a Challenge to the State,” 1981). In the United Kingdom during the course of the miners’ strike, 1984‑5, muck was made by the conservatives of Arthur Scargill’s visit to Lib­ya which was an attempt to raise funds for the National Union of Minework­ers.  

 When in political power, these practices serve not only to marginalise and de­legitimise parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition (and conversely to legitimise the state). Also, in conjunction with more-or-less repressive legislation aimed ostensibly at the defence of the constitution and public order, they can serve to criminalise the opposition. South African anti‑terrorist law is a case in point. There virtually any political activity which does not accept the precepts of apartheid is formally classed as „terrorist“.

 The problem for democracy is not simply that repressive measures might jeopardise the very freedoms they purport to protect. Inevitably there is a danger that parliamentary opposition parties refuse to criticise law and order po­pulism for fear of being stigmatized as „anti-police“ or „pro-terrorist“ with the consequent damage to their electoral Standing. There are no votes for such po­sitions. Parliamentarians, well placed to defend freedoms, allow themselves to be unbalanced as the entire political-cultural structure distorts. A consequence is that extra-parliamentary opposition is further marginalised. As „national security“ becomes the watch word, the ends come to justify the means – a situation which is supposedly the antithesis of liberal democratic ideals and the chief immorality of terrorism itself.

 Further, the claim that all terrorism is directed against Western democracy as a philosophy is rendered in political  discourse as interchangeable with the claim that all terrorism is directed against Western democracies as they exist. These are the two inseparable halves of Netanyahu’s assertion (quoted above, p. 68). Democracy qua philosophy is essential because it is replete with strongly positive valuations that serve as theoretical legitimations for the state. But defence of the democracies as they exist is a defence of the Status quo: the existing power relations, the existing economic relations, everything as is. As the law and order factions respond to what they See as a growing threat from terrorism, and attempt to drag society with them, increased marginalisation ensures a supply of groups which can be identified as potentially threatening.

INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The international situation is directly analogous to the national Situation. Complaints that terrorism endangers international order are commonplace. The very expression „international order,“ or „world order“ is imprecise, for it covers both the mechanisms or processes of international law and politics, and the current disposition of power – including economic power – between states. As with the law and order dichotomy, the one is presented as neutral, the other as natural, so that when „third world“ states on the one hand empha­sise the importance of not labeling international liberation movements as „terrorist,“ and on the other hand pay insufficient respect to the slogan of defend­ing the world order, this is labeled as the politicising of the terrorist debate.

 The appropriate questions are „whose world?“ and „whose order?“ Analysis of the Western understanding of world order shows that it is not the product of a global and impartial general Will and neither is it the product of chance, blindfolded as if the symbolic figure of justice. International order, as a legal mechanism, has been contingent historically upon the emergence of the domi­nant world position of the Western states. Its origins lie in the supposed su­pranational authority of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor and, with their eclipse by the power of princes, in the transfiguration and development of that authority as rules governing the relations of states. The states them­selves were no longer fiefdoms but notionally equal and unitary subjects in­fused, described and legitimated by the novel ideas of sovereign statehood. Globalisation of this essentially European international law and diplomatic practice followed as a part of the pursuit for raw materials, slaves, land and ultimately commodity markets which has determined the political geography of much of the world. The creation of a world order by and on behalf of Western interests was thus legitimated by recourse to the law which was car­ried in the dominators’ baggage. „For instance, from the point of view of the Australian aboriginal, the international law that permitted Australia to be acquired in the name of the British Crown was not an objective body of rules.“ (Clarke, “Reform and Resistance in the International Order,” 1980, p. 26)

This is not to suggest that the international legal System cannot be used by „third world“ states in defence of their interests, or that it is solely an embodi­ment of the current interests of the dominant states. However, the law does embody the violence of the past by legitimating the activities of the present. Attempts to redress the inequities of the past are thus seen as threatening, even revolutionary, and, if they employ the methods used in creating the status quo, they are deemed unlawful. To the extent that acts labeled „terrorist“ accord with efforts of this nature they clearly do attack the existing „international order’“, in the sense of „power System“. But condemnatory labeling of such acts merely because they attack the international order can only be supported if it is first shown that the status quo ought to be defended. The „argument“ that the status quo or anarchy are the only choices – again a simplistic choice constructed through political discourse – is no justification for taking a condemnatory stand.

 The claim that terrorism constitutes an attack on international law amounts to little more than a metaphorical restatement of the proposition that terrorism is contrary to, or in contradiction to, international law. There is no real evidence that terrorism has ever been directed at the mechanisms of international law per se, rather than at its historical effects. There is, nevertheless, a particular contradiction which states find objectionable and that consists of the usurping by putative terrorist groups of one of the prerogatives supposedly reserved for the state – the use of violence itself for political gain. Conceptually there is the challenge of the expansion of the notion of sovereignty, a challenge accentuated when organisations, such as the PLO, claiming to speak for nations (yet titled by some as terrorist) are given a degree of recognition as an international „person.“ Again, this development is not intrinsically evil notwithstanding the rhetoric and objections of the states whose interests are concerned.

 It is impracticable to distinguish absolutely between overt political manipula­tion in the definition of terrorism and the less conscious expression of en­trenched conceptual orientations. Aspects of the discussion of international order exemplify this statement. Probably for the majority in Western states concepts such as “state sovereignty” are of self-evident validity rather than consequences of a particular history. Before turning to more explicit examples of cultural bias, one more example of political maneuver is presented.

 Alleged acts of terrorism are highly functional as justifications for the continuation of repressive foreign (and internal) policies. A classic instance of modern times is that of the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939 which was justified as a reprisal for the sabotage of a radio station by „Polish soldiers“ who were, in reality, German concentration camp victims who had been promised their freedom for this undertaking. (M.R.D. Foot, “Resistance,” 1976.)  There is no shortage of such examples. Rhetorical and physical attacks on „terrorists“ can also serve as foci for moral‑ideological gamesmanship, for pushing others toward adopting a desired position, internationally no less than internally. It has been widely suggested that one purpose of the attack by the U.S.A. on Libya in 1986 was to convince the Western states of the need to take relatively „moderate“ action against allegedly terrorist states, before the U.S.A. felt obliged to repeat its bombing campaign.

 HUMAN RIGHTS – A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES?

 Turning to the cultural element, alongside the questions of domestic law and order and international order, is that of the innocent victim. The term „inno­cence“ is subject to ideological use;sbttt‑xridre,pfofotit4ly it is the logical coun­terpart to the Western tradition of human rights, originating in the natural law of the Church and developing (like the notion of sovereignty) during the time of the American and French national revolutions. Although human rights are nominally of universal application, slaves and colonial populations were downgraded to the status of untutored children, untamed savages or worse, and were excluded from benefiting from such rights until modern times. In­deed, for over two hundred years the colonised have been permitted to fight for their masters’ rights, most ironically that of self‑determination: „an impera­tive principle of action which statement will henceforth ignore at their peril“ according to President Wilson in 1918. The lawyer, L.C. Green has remarked that the references to the right of self-determination in the UN General Assem­bly resolutions on terrorism have resulted in its elevation „above human life“, as if lives had not been thrown away in the cause of European and American national liberation. (L.C. Green, “The Legislation of Terrorism,” in Y. Alexander, D. Carlton and P. Wilkinson [eds.], “Terrorism: Theory and Practice,” 1979.)

 The West’s assumption that military and industrial supremacy also entailed moral supremacy has led to the conclusion that „the Judaeo-Christian tradition“ alone produced a system of human rights (e.g. J.E. Bond, “The Rules of Riot,” 1974, ch. l). In turn the concept of human rights has become a central tenet of the ethical legitimation of Western liberal democratic states. Conse­quently, an act construed as an attack on human rights is almost automatically registered as an attack on liberal democratic values. Because public and media consciousness of human rights issues is maintained by, amongst other things, the regular political attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies, major violations of human rights are perceived as a typically foreign occurrence, confirming the equation of human rights with liberal democracy.

 Terrorism is seen as confronting human rights because of its avowedly political nature. Furthermore, although most political theorists accept the legitimacy of political violence in certain circumstances, it is regarded as axiomatic that these circumstances are not to be found within liberal democracies. Thus terrorism is considered doubly outrageous: it is alien both in terms of those who carry it out and in terms of its incompatibility with the political system. These often inchoate beliefs provide the ground on which political manipulation can operate.

The mass media constitutes an intervening variable. It is widely criticised for „doing the terrorists job for them“: “The terrorist uses it (television) to publi­cise his message and, when he kills one, to frighten ten thousand.“ (R. Clutterbuck, “Terrorism: A Soldier’s View,” in “Ten Years of Terrorism,” 1979, p.70) An attraction of terrorism for the mass media is that it is violent, dramatic, sensational and radically extra‑normal to every day life. But the causes and contexts of terrorism are rarely as dramatic and so cannot compete successful­ly for the limited space or air time. Since they are often grounded in problems which have existed unresolved for years or decades they do not even earn the titles „news“ or „current events“. Accordingly, the representation of terrorism is as if it were without cause or reason, hence the „fanatic“, „deviant“ and „mad“ labels which are so easily attached to the event and its perpetrators.

Terrorism, characterised by random but nevertheless deliberate action viola­ting liberal democratic rights, can be contrasted with other social problems which produce a lower level of public concern – and undoubtedly less political concern – despite being harmful to or wasteful of life. Why is a death from a terrorist bomb more horrifying than death in a road accident? If the greater, weighting for deaths is justified, by stating that those who use road transport  tacitly accept the possibility of fatal accidents caused exclusively by others then settlers living in colonies must accept similar risks. lf, in the one case, the risk is a corollary of a „right“ to travel by car, then in the other it is a corol­lary of a „right“ to expropriate and exploit.

However, when it is the elderly poor who die through cold, unable to heat their homes as a result of inadequate state benefits, the analysis is more difficult. On the one hand their deaths are the calculable outcome of a deliberate policy, like many of those occurring as a consequence of terrorist or military actions. Ort the other hand there is none of the risk-countervailing benefit that can be assumed in the examples of road travel and colonial settlement. It must be stressed that this British example of elderly people dying is actual, not hy­pothetical, and their deaths result from a „sin of commission,“ not merely from the absence of state action, a „sin of omission“. These pensioners are „innocent“ and it is difficult to accept their right to life should be of less politi­cal import than that of terrorist victims unless we introduce ideological exigencies. Doubtedlessly, their story is of less headline value for the mass media.

INDIVIDUALISM OR CONTEXT?

 Western human rights are first and foremost rights of the individual. The brand of empiricist positivism historically and ideologically associated with the hey day of capitalism (and especially its Anglo-Saxon variants) compre­hends only this atomised being, and not the social collectivities in which, on other accounts, he or she is enmeshed. Anglo‑Saxon jurisprudence, strongly influenced by positivistic thinking, has been so imbued with this individualism that when legal cognizance of Joint stock companies was forced by „dull economic necessity“ the companies could only be construed formally as persons. English judges (and many politicians) when invited to think about col­lectives and collective action respond negatively. „The common law knows nothing of a balance of collective forces. It is (and this is its strength and its weakness) inspired by the belief in the equality (real or fictitious) of individuals, it operates between individuals and not otherwise...“ (O. Kahn-Freund, “Labour and the Law,” 1972, p. 2.) Perhaps the only clean exceptions are those instances where the collectivity can be abstracted and re‑presented as a reified symbolic focus for emotional appeals, as „the nation“ or „the national interest.“

 Formal emphasis on the individual and individual rights (often rights to pro­perty) leads unfailingly back to the epistemological and psychological notions of the individual acting exclusively as an autonomous and atomic free will. The logical consequence is the conservative criminology in which social factors are dismissed and explanation is reduced to the espousal of Evil (Original Sin) as an agent in human affairs, or to psychopathology. There is, of course, a plethora of Western theories of terrorism couched in these terms.

 Thus context is denied. The possibility of terrorism being an act undertaken by the individual on behalf of the collectivity is submerged. Terrorists become terrorists because their mothers are over-dominant, they are symboli­cally killing their fathers, they are overcome by „narcissistic rage“ (although resistance fighters against German occupation, 1939-45, chose their course because they were „exceptionally brave“.) Ultimately, some Western commentators feel compelled to note that some states regard terrorism as a political issue, as if that were somehow unusual and surprising. (Cf. E.H. Evans, “American Policy Responses to International Terrorism,” in M.H. Livingstone [ed.], “International Terrorism in the Contemporary World,” 1978, p. 382.)

 Individuation proceeds in the analysis of the act as well as the actor. The sin­gle incident is divorced from its context of cause and campaign. To the empiri­cist, empiricism is realism: the UK delegate at the United Nations Assembly is therefore a realist who says „The most hopeful course was to concentrate on acts and victims, not as perpetrators or motives.“ (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN Document A/32/37, 1977, p. 34.) Treating symptoms rather than relieving causes, the logical outcome of this approach, will not eliminate terrorism if precedents are accurate predictors. In the first half of the nineteenth century London was terrorised by cholera: pa­tients were treated and patients died. In the second half of that century London had a causal theory of cholera, and the sewers and clean water that the theory demanded were constructed. No doubt that in the short term the resolution of the problem was more expensive than disposing of corpses but ultimately it was efficacious.

 TERRORISM AND OBJECTIVITY

 Does this suggest that the definition of terrorism is impossible? Schmid, as noted earlier, advocates a social science definition but concludes that „we can­not offer a true or correct definition.“ (Schmid, 1984, p. 110) Certainly this is true for many of the objects of social science, „social class“ for example, which are defined differently according to competing theories.

 One of the factors underlying this Situation is the relative non‑availability of ostensive definition in the social sciences – relative that is to everyday „com­mon sense“ and also to many natural sciences. Within certain limits it is possible to point to a chair or, in principle, to a carbon atom and, with at most a few words of elucidation, know enough to recognise chairs and carbon atoms wherever they occur and with an expectation of agreement from other observers. But neither „social class“ nor „terrorism,“ nor many other elements in the domain of the social sciences, are like that. They are terms which refer to abstractions in a way that „chair“ or „carbon atom“ do not. „Social class“ refers above all to a relationship. Terrorism refers either to a theoretical orientation or more generally a social practice – a particular manner of achieving political ends. They are both the products of, or arise from, human social acts and are therefore imbued with the actor’s consciousness. An outside observer’s interpretation may well differ from that of the actor (we have already suggested some pertinent cultural factors that can affect Interpretation.) Additionally, the social context is not fixed but subject to historical change, which makes it more problematic to say categorically that one is dealing with the same pheno­menon over a period of years or across cultures.

 Even in the natural sciences it is a truism that all observation is theory bound: that, to put it crudely, what you see is conditioned by what you expect. As one probes deeper for justification in any domain of knowledge, a level is fi­nally reached at which justification becomes circular, or simply stops. In the last analysis, a theory (or observation) is accepted because: I. it can be made to fit into the nexus of relevant theories already accepted; II. it works better (i.e. it is more functional, has greater explanatory or predictive power, etc.) than any alternative which those deemed to be competent authorities are prepared to consider; and III. that it receives more support than opposition from those with power to affect the outcome. (Cf. T.S. Kuhn, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” 1970; I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave [eds], “Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,” 1974 on the philosophy of science; M. Foucault, “The Order of Things,” 1970, and “The Archeology of Knowledge,” 1972 on culture.)

  “No amount of accumulated fact will in and of itself determine that one particular the­ory be accepted and another rejected, since by modification of the theory, or by other means, the observations in question can be accommodated to it.“ (A. Giddens, “Central Problems in Social Theory,” 1977, p. 243.)

 It will be evident that those criteria are not necessarily scientific. Copernicus met with Opposition because he undermined the Church’s claim to authority on all matters by offering a rival cosmology – the development of atomic theory was fuelled by the search for a super-weapon. To refer back to an earlier example, it is highly likely that there is more public institutional money available in the USA for research on terrorism than for work and road accidents. This is not to say that the acceptability of scientific theories is determined only by the interests they affect but interests cannot be ignored. It must also be noted that a consequence of opting for any one theory is an alteration to the range of possible subsequent theories. Since interpreting and conceptualising are themselves social acts there is an intrinsic potential for social (including political) consequence. In the social sciences this potential manifests itself as the problem of reflexivity: terrorists (and politicians) reading books on terrorism may conduct their affairs differently thereafter.

 The criteria mentioned above say nothing of truth. Newton’s theories of mass and the interaction of masses were considered for a long time to be true. As universal statements they were then superseded by Einstein’s theories and became no more than approximately true in certain circumstances. Logically it is possible that Einstein’s theories will in turn be supplanted, whether entirely or partially, and it is therefore logically impossible to say they are true. More, because we cannot say with certainty what is true, it is not possible to talk of successive approximation to the truth in a properly meaningful manner. Truth is itself a construct which is adequate for objects susceptible to immediate apprehension, like chairs and cats which sit on mats, but less so for more complex matters. It is unfortunate for the social sciences that their objects mutate at a fairly rapid rate.

 Truth then is not so mach the object of knowledge but a property of it. The „real“ world external to us can only be comprehended by us as subjective human beings and the search for an absolute objectivity in the social sciences is a chimera. Objectivity can only have meaning when reconstituted as inter-subjectivity, the sum of elements common to the understanding of those involved.

  The social science definition of terrorism for which Schmid calls can only therefore be a consensus. But we are then full circle, for almost all the social scientists are Western. In our view the best hope for progress will rely on what global „inter-subjectivity“ exists, that is the Geneva Conventions, the UN Declaration on Torture and those other elements of international law accepted universally. In the meantime definitions of terrorism must be considered in the same manner as the phenomena they purport to define, which is with full regard to their origins and contexts. Above all, when terrorism is discussed „don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use.“ (L. Wittgenstein, „Philosophical Investigations,“ 1963.)