The Dialectic of Power and Law
The United Nations and the "New World Order"

Lecture delivered at The University of Iceland
Reykjavik, 19 August 2003

SUMMARY

The basic weakness of the system of international organization represented by the United Nations consists in the fact that it contains an irreconcilable normative contradiction, namely between (a) the principle of the sovereign equality of member states and (b) the privileged position of the five permanent members of the Security Council, expressed in the veto right. Thus, a heavy price has been paid by the international community for the (partly) supranational authority vested in the Security Council. Incorporating the power balance as it prevailed at the end of the Second World War, the world organization has been unable to reform itself along democratic lines.

The Charter is itself based on a compromise between power and law, combining two contradictory elements or procedures: (a) The international rule of law is ensured through a system of collective security guaranteed by the Security Council's enforcement powers under Chapter VII; whereas (b) the authority of the Council, guaranteeing the rule of law, is intrinsically linked to the veto power of the permanent members (i.e. to their individual security) – exempting them de facto from the application of the very rule of law they are supposed to ensure.

Ever since its foundation, this state of affairs – which may euphemistically be described as the "dialectic of power and law" – has condemned the world organization to a "policy of double standards" (a predicament which has become even more acute under the conditions of the present unipolar power constellation, prematurely called the "New World Order"). The unilateral actions of its most powerful member state increasingly threaten the organization with marginalization as the events of 2002/2003 in connection with the war against Iraq have drastically demonstrated.

Because the international rule of law cannot be enforced against a permanent member of the Security Council – i.e. because the Charter's ban on the unilateral use of force is ineffective vis-à-vis the permanent members –, the case will have to be made for a major paradigm shift by way of a democratic reform of the United Nations Organization (including the abrogation of the veto right) or, absent the endorsement of such a reform by the five permanent members, for the creation of a new international (eventually supranational) organization by intergovernmental treaty – similar to the initiative undertaken by United Nations member states, in defiance of the only superpower's declared will, for the creation of an international criminal court as supranational organization of criminal justice. If no action towards reform is undertaken and if the present state of paralysis prevails, the world organization may well suffer the fate of the earlier League of Nations.
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Structure/ main topics

• The Charter of the United Nations Organization – Legacy of the power balance of 1945
• The dialectical relationship between power and law in the international system: Can the United Nations Organization avoid the contradictions resulting from the international rule of law depending upon the power of the nation-state and at the same time requiring the taming of that very power?
• How can the Security Council be perceived as embodiment of supranational authority when it has to operate in the framework of an international organization based on the sovereign equality of states (and on the supremacy of its five permanent members)?
• The veto rule of Art. 27: normative inconsistency in the Charter resulting from a compromise with power politics? Is the veto provision compatible with the principle of sovereign equality?
• The United Nations' imperfect system of collective security versus the requirements of the international rule of law – The problems of multilateralism in a unilateralist framework
• The conditions for the United Nations' acting as guarantor of the international rule of law: (a) in the bipolar system of the Cold War; (b) in the unipolar system of the "New World Order;" (c) in an eventual multipolar system of the future.
• The de-legitimization of the United Nations Organization under the conditions of unipolarity: is there an alternative to the dilemma between the paralysis of the Security Council on the one hand and post facto legitimization (by the Council) of the actions of power politics on the other? (e.g. Gulf War 1991, Yugoslavia/Kosovo war 1999, Afghanistan war 2001/2002, Iraq war 2003)
• The unavoidable "policy of double standards" under the conditions (a) of the veto privilege in the Security Council and (b) the unipolar power balance in the "New World Order"
• The need of United Nations reform (by way of democratization of decision-making in the Security Council; introducing a genuine separation of powers between legislative, executive and judicial functions of the UN, etc.): assessment of the possibilities under the conditions of global power politics
• Realism versus idealism – The marginalization of the world organization in the framework of unipolarity: will the United Nations Organization escape the fate of the League of Nations?
• What, if any, are the alternatives for the future of international organization if the international rule of law is to be preserved – or reestablished – under the conditions of global power politics?
• Can the dialectic of power and law ever be brought in conformity with the requirements of international organization?
Selected literature by the author