In this lecture I will deal with the legal implications of economic sanctions. I will not cover diplomatic sanctions, which are rather straightforward from a legal standpoint, in any detail..    Diplomatic sanctionsThese entail acts of state sovereignty such as the withdrawal of diplomats, reduction of the number of accredited diplomats which one country allows another to send, and alike. This diplomatic tit-for-tat game of daily diplomatic needle prick routine , so-to-speak, is not the concern of my presentation today.

Regarding economic sanctions the difference between unilateral and multilateral sanctions is crucial. In -order to avoid terminological misunderstandings, I refer to specificconcrete examples as an introduction: those sanctions imposed by the US on a regular basis, especially since the end of the Cold Wwar, aremay be called unilateral. Also theBut economic sanctions by intergovernmentalsupranational entities, such as those which the European Union imposed onagainst Russia, fall under this category.

As far as the legal implications of sanctions are concerned, one needs to bear the following difference in mind: Unilateral means, that one state or a group of states – acting as a supranational entity - either as an organization (such as the EU) or as an ad hoc coalition – imposes sanctions as measures of economic «punishment.». Such acts don’´t result from any legal, let alone internationally binding, obligation. Multilateral sanctions, on the other hand,  are measures imposed to exert economic pressure within the United Nations system of collective security; they are  which are binding for all UN member states. From the legal standpoint, of view this is completely different. Multilaterality«Multilateral»ism in this context means that sanctions are, so-to-speak, imposed by the international community and therefore are legally binding onto all its members – unlike unilateral measures byof one state or a group of states.

Unilateral sanctions

As far as unilateral sanctions are concerned, it goes without saying that reconciliation is the ideal way how states should settle their disagreements. They should resolve – after solving contradictory positions and conflicts of interests by means of negotiation. Diplomacy would be the conduct of choice between states in anthis ideal world. In the real worldlife, however, states often tend to pursue their foreign policy, and assert their national interests, by way of pressure. This is especially so in cases when there exists an imbalance bilateral relations are not too rarely influenced by one state expressing their position of foreign affairs, i.e. “national interest”, by pressuring the other side to move into the desired direction – especially if there is a discrepancy of of power.  between the two. Unilateral economic sanctions are nothing else but one state trying to force itstheir will on another. The temptation to assert one’s realize their interests by means of sanctions will obviously be much  greater if the aone state is much more powerful than another statethe other, and vice versa. The rRepublic of San Marino, for -instance, will never dream of imposing sanctions against the United Sstates of America.

“In other words, as a matter of realpolitik, sanctions only make sense if there is an imbalance of power. There is empirical evidence for this. Over the last few decades, the United States, The USA as the most powerful countrystate on Earth at this point in history, has have imposed a lot more sanctions than all other states together over the last few decades. DMore detailed statistics would go beyond the scope of this presentation. What comes to mind, in this regard, Important to note in this regard is  is the aspect of arbitrariness, even blackmailing, as an instrument of foreign policyrelations. Often, the there is an attitude is one of self-righteousness, which which leadsguides the sanctioning state (or group of states) into act as if issuinging sentences of collective punishment.   TAt present this has been particularly obviouscomes apparent in the case of the Russian sanctions.

 One should bear in mind that with this kind of inter-state conduct risks further there is a danger of economic sanctions increasing political tensions instead of calming the situation down. This means that sSanctions belong to the arsenal of power politics and are generally counter-productive when it comes to regarding the establishment of a sustainable order of international peace systempeace. Furthermore, with the degree of global economic interconnectedness today, the impact and consequences of sanctions are more serious as compared to the time after World War II It is noteworthy, that their impact has grown with the degree of global economic interconnectedness and is much graver today as compared with times when the economyic relations were was less globalized. This means that the topic is much more pressing now than in the Post-War times with their monolithic power and economy structures who interacted on a relatively small scale.   

As far as athe legal evaluation is concerned, unilateral sanctions are incompatible with clearly in breach of the the Wworld Ttrade Oorganization´s (WTO) free- trade regime. Eagreement – which regardless of all hymns sung in its praise especially in the Western world, these regulations have always been considered as paradigm for the conduct of international economic relations.  us always being praised and proclaimed. And again, pPrecisely that the very state country that most vigorously promoteding the free -trade doctrine at the time ofwhen the foundation of the Wworld Ttrade Oorganization ( as the successor to GATT, the  (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was negotiated, namely the United States, isare now the country most frequently gravely violating the free -trade principles as codified by the WTO. The US does so in – at all instances wheren it uses the economy for political purposesis instrumentalized for political purposes, as I will illustrate in the following. The principle of non-discrimination in international trade and, more generally, the maximdoctrine that the state should not interfere no state should interferewith international economic activitiesthe economy (whether domestic or international), stands at the core of the rules and regulations of core of what had been agreed upon with GATT, and is now the body of the WTO rules. This is also in conformitycorresponds to with the common sense expectation self-explanatory ideal that either that the trading partner beyond the borders – in any foreign state – should be dependable and predictable. This obviously cannot be the case if unpredictable governmental decisions With sudden government orders to make the continuation of trade and economic relations – and the fulfilling of contracts – impossiblecancel the respective trade activity always looming, no trading partner can guarantee this obviously.

A further problem for the legal evaluation of unilateral sanctions liesThe in the exceptions from the free trade rules under the WTO regime.fact that the legal instruments ruling free-trade include exceptions from the obligations mentioned above creates another problem for a legal evaluation of unilateral sanctions  – especially so since tThese exceptions are phrased in such an imprecise woolly way that all states may decide more or less arbitrarily, i.e. in a self-serving manner, on their own when on whether  they see the conditions for an fulfilled for such an exception are met or not. I can only summarily refer here to the respective regulationsparagraphs. Crucial in this regard is Article XXI21 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now incorporatedas it was transferred into the body of rules of the Wworld Ttrade Oorganization rules by a formal agreement, is crucial in this regard. Another relevant provision, in this regard, isFurthermore, Aarticle XIV bis14b of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which was subsequently negotiated in the course of the establishment of, after later when the WTO had been established should be mentioned. States thatwho impose unilateral sanctions userefer to these provisionsrules of exceptions in order to circumvent to justify their ignoring the free- trade regulationsagreements in the specific case in specific cases. What do these exceptions mean? A WTO member state may invoke these exceptions when its «essential security interests» are at stakeThey may be invoked by a state in-order to maintain crucial security interests –. This specifically relates to the following : regarding the following issues: trade with fissionableble materials, «traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war,»arms trade in general, and  or inany action of a state taken «in time of war or other «emergencyies in international relations.»» such as wars.

Exceptions from free trade rules also apply in regard to the obligations of states under the provisions of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, obligations of a state under the UN Ccharter agreements for the protection of peace and international security will justify exceptions from the free-trade agreements. This duty applies specifically applies to bindingcoercive resolutions of the measurements imposed by the Security Council under pursuantaccording to Cchapter VII of the UN Ccharter. AAll member states must comply if the Security Council imposes agrees on economic sanctions onagainst a countrymember state – as multilateral measures. According to the Charter, the Security Council is the supreme executive organ of the United Nations. Consequently, decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter Since the authority of the Security Council stands above all other bodies according to the UN Ccharter, chapter VII sanctionsagreements overrule free- trade regulations of agreements of other intergovernmental organizations as well as bilateral treaties between member states. CWhile certain interested parties state actors have claimed in the past that exceptions from free trade rules, resulting from their obligations under the UN Charter, may also be invoked independently of Chapter VII resolutions. This interpretation of obligations under the UN Charter is highly questionable. Security Council measurements were not required for overruling free-trade agreements with reference to obligations resulting from UN membership, I doubt this, thoughIt invites arbitrary action by states that . Allowing such an arbitrary interpretation of international law would remove all obstacles against are more interested in the pursuit of power politics than in ensuring respect for international law.  the legitimization of certain states acting in their own, power-politically motivated, interests.   

Finally, regarding the exemptions from ceptions from free -trade rulesagreements, the codification work of the UN International Law Commission of the United Nations must be taken into accountneeds to be dealt with. In -particular, I would like to refer to draw the attention to the Ccommission´s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, a document thatwhich  was adoptedccepted by the UN Ggeneral Aassembly inaccording to resolution 56/83 ofn 12th December 2001. Though legally non-binding, it may be considered as  and therefore constitutes a guideline for the interpretation of international law nonetheless., if only with the character of a suggestion.   AArticle 49, Par. 1 of the Draft Articlesis document provides that s suggests that a state may, under certain conditions, «take countermeasuressuffering from a breach of international  against such a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act law has the right to take measures against the perpetrating state «in -order to induce that Sstate to comply with its obligations». .» Recently, this provision was invoked to justify norm was cited in argumentations regarding the unilateral sanctions imposed against Russia in connection with the armed conflicts in Ukraine and especially the question of territorial state sovereignty over a part of of parts of the Ukraineian territory.  in particular.

First and foremost, Tthe crucial problem with these exception rules onf exceptions – that are the only avenue for the legal justification of the only legal foundation for a justification of unilateral sanctions – is their imn-precision. According to the WTO regulations,rities states are not required to give any reasons or provide specific evidence offer evidence or proofs for the existence of a threat to their essential the alleged risk to their security interests. How a sanctioning state makes use of an exception from free trade rules is at the sole discretion of that stateT. he sanctioning state´s self-judgement of their security interests is enough to claim an exception from free-trade rules. The criteria for In short this is referred to as “«self-judged security exceptions»”.  are not subject to the scrutiny of anNo independent body will ever investigate any criteria of such claims. This again illustrates the earlier mentioned problem of self-righteousness, which I mentioned above.. Exception rules of this kind almost unavoidably invite abuses of powers defined in such a manner throw the gates wide-open for the arrogance of power. Unlike multilateral sanctions there is no legal corrective whatsoever. No credible international court will deal with these matters. Within the framework of the WTO, there are indeed mechanisms There may be to resolve disputes between member states ( «Dispute Settlement Bodyies»). There is  within the framework of the WTO and also an «Appellate Body» in Geneva consisting of with seven persons. , supposedly independent judges in Geneva.   However, Aas far as I could verify, however, matters related to unilateral sanctions have so far not been referred to it. this body has never been appealed to regarding unilateral sanctions. Usual cases deal with procedural disagreements, such as one state blaming another not to comply with the WTO fairness rules etc. For the state targeted by unilateral sanctions, tThis leaves essentially only an option of realpolitik: namely the sanctioned state with just the realpolitik optionto take retaliatory action of retaliation measures, in other words: to impose «counter-sanctions» – provided that state feels strong enough to take such measuresthey dare to.

As far as the legal evaluation is concerned, Economic such sanctions, quasi-legitimized more-or-less covered by theWTO  exception rules of the WTO, may nonethelessin fact amount to seriousvere violations of international law. This relates to , specifically the general prohibition of interference in the internal affairsto interfere with internal matters of another states,  but also to the principle of sovereign equality of states (Aarticle 2[[13] of the UN Ccharter). Apart from these generalIn addition to such formal aspects of international law, economic sanctions may also result in grave violations of fundamental human rights  of the population in the targeted country – violations though this is often  - although these may be more difficult to prove than the aforebefore-mentioned formal violations of general principles of international law. (In recent years, this was As I will show in more detail later, an issue with multilateral sanctions in particular.)this problem has become acute especially for multilateral sanctions in the recent past.

There are no effective legal mechanisms at the international level to investigateprove and prosecuteunishvenge violations of law, in particular fundamental human rights,  resulting from unilateral sanctions. The International Court of Justice in The Hague may be, so -to -speak, the «court of the United NationsUN court,» but it is totally irrelevant in this contextregard. Theis Ccourt maycan only deal with investigate legal disputesallegations and proposesuggest settlement a settlementmeasures if provided the states have explicitly recognized its jurisdiction or referred the respective dispute and appealed to the Ccourt for arbitration.   

As regards the legal evaluation of unilateral sanctions, tThere is also an important domestic aspect., too, for the legal evaluation of unilateral sanctions. Once a state imposes sanctions against one or several other states, that stateit also interferes with the rights of companiesrporations operating from its own territory.   With the sanctions, the state hampers with the trade activities of these companiesrporations and may in the extreme case drive them into bankruptcy. In this regard, the position The viewpoint of the United States Chamber of Commerce is particularly revealing in this regard. In September 2016, the Chamber They issued atheir statement entitled “«Oppose Unilateral Economic Sanctions,”» in September 2016, arguing that sanctionsthese «have often damaged would generally damage U.S. economic interests both at home and overseasabroad.»   Moreover, the Chamber states, the extraterritorial enforcement invocation of the sanctions could « incite economic, diplomatic and legal conflicts» lead to economic, diplomatic and legal controversies with otheradditional states, including allies of the US. This statement, which washad been issued before the election of Donald Trump, explicitly refers to the sanctions against Cuba, in place since 1960. It is pPoolitically quite significantinteresting, though but hardly noticed known to anybody abroad,, that the United States Chamber of Commerce of the United States –- from the country that very state which usesemploys the instrument of unilateral sanctions rather excessively – is an outspoken opponent of exactly this very politicyal practice.

Unilateral sanctions – especially as regardsresulting in  export limitations for export – cause damage to the economy of the sanctioning state in general. Since sanctions reduce its own domestic income, as far as tax revenue is concerned, the sanctioning state «cuts off theits nose to spite theits face.» If a state is as convinced of free trade In-general one may say: Being as convinced of free-trade as the United StatesS claims to be, apparently are – who and keeps recommending that principlethis principle to the whole world – , such a state should refrain from political interferingence with itstheir export trade. P and private entrepreneurs should not allow themselves to be heeold hostage to their state´s power politics. This indeed seems to be the attitude of entrepreneurs in the United States if one readsReading the statement by the US Cchamber of Ccommerce. this seems to be the basic attitude of entrepreneurs in the US, too. For the over-all cost-benefit - eequation, the losses due to retaliatoryion measures of the sanctioned state need to be taken into consideration as well.

The most seriousgravest problemaspect of unilateral sanctions, as far as international law is concerned, is however the above-mentioned extraterritoriality, i.e. the violation of economic rights – or sovereignty rights of states, respectively – of third parties.   Under no circumstances is it acceptable in legal terms thatif third states – which, who are not involved in any disputequarrel aone state may havefight with another state by means of economic sanctions – are subjectedtied  to these unilateral sanctions of that state against the second state. and therefore drawn into a conflict in which the sanctioning state wants to force another party to adopt a certain position or abandon its previous one Third-party states must not be drawn into a bilateral conflict by way of an extraterritorial enforcement of sanctions. No state has the right to dictate to other states, or companies within other states, how they should go about their economic business. Exactly tThis problem became apparent when the US congress passed was the controversy surrounding the so-called Helmes- Burton Act of the US Congress («Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996») bywith which the United States enforced its unilateral unilateral sanctions against against Cuba were to be also vis-à-visimposed on companies in or from otherthird countries, too.[1] Using laws such as the Helms-Burton Act, the US assumes the right to take action against foreign companies doing business with a sanctioned state (such as Cuba or Iran) if they As soon as companies from Europe, for-instance, who have branches in the US or undertakehave financial transactions viaperformed by US banks. and do business with a sanctioned state (such as Cuba or Iran) the US assume the right with laws like the Helmes Burton Act to punish these foreign companies.  Another example for this kind of political e severe interference with international economic relations are the difficulties which the European Airbus Consortium has facedfaces with their its business commercial activities in Iran insofar as , should the exported planes contain elements produced in the US.

 The sanctioning state usually ignores the legal problems caused by resulting from such an exaggerated assertion of national sovereignty attitudes (namelyi.e. the extraterritorial enforcement of sanctions).  are usually ignored by the sanctioning state sinceLip service at the United Nations notwithstanding, the overriding goal  their goal is not the promotion of the internationalrule of international rule of law, highly praised by the UN as it may be, but simply to induceforce the sanctioned state to change its policyadopt a certain desired behaviour. As such Because such demandspretensions are almost always  made develop in a constellation in situations where there exists an of power imbalance  of power relationsin most instances, appealing to a judiciallegal tribunalcourt is a waste of timee for the sanctioned state. from the start. The only effective response will be Only retaliationory measures by the sanctioned state (on its own, if this is at all an option, or in alliance with other states).against the sanctioning state by the sanctioned state alone, provided this is an option as a matter of realpolitik, or in alliance with other states would be a relevant response.

Multilateral sanctions

In their very nature, -essence sanctions are hostile measures on a scale of escalation  which culminates in armed conflict. This is especially true of the multilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations. Pursuant According to the Cchapter VII agreements of the UN Ccharter the world organization is authorizedobliged to maintain or re-restoreestablish international peace and international security. Article 39 of the cCharter assigns this rules that this is the task toof the Security Council,  which acts in the name of all member states in this regard. Sanctions are one of the tools, which the Security Council maycan employ within the UN system of is framework of collective security.   

Accordingly, mMultilateral economic sanctions therefore have a totally different legal status as compared towith the the above-mentioned unilateral measures taken by single states or groups of states explained above. Sanctions imposed by the UN are per definition always measures to secure the international rule of law, insofar as the prohibition of aggressionviolence in international relations (Aarticle 2[4] of the UN Ccharter) needs to be enforced. In this regard,, for which the Security Council, as the sole competent body under the Charter, is vested with entitled to comprehensive vast coercive powers. measures and which is its sole responsibility. Economic sanctions are one of those coercive tools, which the Ccouncil is authorizedcompetentapable to employ.   According to Aarticles 41 and 42, the measuresarsenal ranges from complete or partial partial and total interruption of economic relations and of means of transportation and communication disruption of information and traffic connections via economic measures to the use employment of armed forces.   The underlying rationalephilosophy of the system of collective security is that of favours a gradual escalation. Initially,At first the aim is the pacific settlement of to peacefully settle disputes disagreements for which the Security Council may make concrete recommendationssuggestions under Cchapter VI of the Ccharter. Should the Ccouncil, however, come to reach the conclusion that negotiations have failed, and determine the existence of a threat to the peace or breach of the peace, it may make use of its coercive powers under Chapter VII will not suffice, and a warlike emergency is imminent, they may escalate to the use of force according to chapter VII in -– in order to maintain or restore international-establish peace and security. Which measures to apply is at the discretion of the Security Council alone.

At the end this is about the right of the international community, represented by the Security Council, to enforce the prohibition of violence in international relations, which includes partial or comprehensive economic sanctions as possible options and for which the scope of discretion is with the Security Council alone. The political reality or, in factafter all:, human nature is such, that domestic peace or the internal rule of law will only be guaranteed as- long as the monopoly on violence («Gewaltmonopol») rests with the state, as Max Weber classically phrased it. Internationally, the Security Council possesseshas this monopoly. Unlike in the case of unilateral sanctions, there exists is at least some sort of a corrective to arbitrary decisions in this statutorary framework. I would like to call it – a “«corrective of power politicspower-political corrective,»” so to speak. First -of all, it is not just one state, however powerful it may be, but a group of 15 states[2] – not just one, however powerful it may be – that decides upon the imposition of coercive measures to be imposed. Any decision of the Council This requires a majority of 9 (out of 15) votesstates. Moreover, at least on the level of regarding non-permanent membership, , all world regions of the world are represented in the Councilgroup. Secondly, for a decision onf sanctions to be binding, there must be no veto by one of the five permanent members.   Under the current circumstances, this is the special power-political corrective of power politics. Sanctions need to be decided by way of consensus among  as a mutual agreement by allthe five permanent members (the great powers victorious powers of the post-war erafrom the time after the second world war). This explains why  so that – compared to the quite different from the practice of unilateral sanctions – the number of multilateral sanctions has been relatively small since the foundation of the UN.

 However, in this framework, Legally even greater legal problems may arise as compared to in this setting as compared with unilateral sanctions. This is due to the results from the interrelatednessconnection of the decision-making rules of procedure as laid down in the of the  Ccharter (Aarticle 27) with norms (Articles 24-25) establishing the regulations about the legal primacy of the Security Council, a body, which John Foster Dulles once referred to as a “«law unto itself.»”.[3] (The statutory position of the Security Council is indeed the most striking example In fact this is a consequence of the lack of a non-existing separationdivision of powers within the UN.)  As mentioned above, decisions onabout  (multilateral) sanctions can only be made if no permanent member castsstate declares a veto. At the same time, all states are bound by these decisions, because they are based on Cchapter VII of the Ccharter. They also prevail overbreak domestic law. There is no way to appeal. TEven the International Court of Justice has recognized the primacy of the Security Council in this regard.   When Libya appealed to the International Court of Justice to requestdemand  provisional measures in connection with a dispute about the interpretation of the so-called Montreal Cconvention of 1971[4] concerning the 1988 terror attack over Lockerbie (Scotland), the Ccourt has confirmed that it was competentto be entitled to judge resolutions of the Security Council only if theyse  arewere not based on Cchapter VII of the Ccharter, which includes coercive measures to maintain or restoreenforce or re-establish peace (ruling of 27 February 1998). In other words, in the United Nations systemT there existsis, in other words, no option of for a legal revision in the framework of the UN as soon as the Security Council exercises its coercive powers of coercive measures. This applies to the holds true for imposition imposing of economic sanctions as well as to the use or authorization of military forceemploying or authorizing armed forces.

A twofold legal problem arises from this. Firstly: How should a situation be judged in which the Security Council itself, by means of its sanctions regime, violates human rights by means of its sanction regime? This question was posed by tThe International Progress Organization was – the first non-governmental organization to raise the question – before the UN Hhuman Rrights Ccommission in Geneva in the summer of 1991.[5] In 1990, tThe Security Council had imposed a comprehensive sanctions regime onagainst Iraq. in 1990 The Council and maintained these punitive measures, withit in ever increasing severity, over a period of more than 10 years. According to a 1996 surveydocumentation of the “«Harvard Study Team,”» from the year 1996 these sanctions caused resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people.[6] The facts are shocking and disillusioning: The Security Council passes a resolution that results in a grave violation of which results in grave violations of elementary the basic human rights of an entire nation – the right to life, the right to health, etc.  There is no way whatsoever to challengeoppose this resolution by legal meanslegally.   Political options are very limited due to the weakness – often also cowardice and opportunism as well – of the other member states. Power politics knows no conscienceousness – also, and even more so,  including situations in which it appears when it hides behindunder the cloak of UN «collective security». considerations. The only figure of global significance who dared to speak outup openly at the time was Ppope John Paul II.

The second seriousgrave legal problem arises from the decision-making rules of procedure in the Security Council. All decisions – except those about questions of procedureconduct – requireneed to the consent of the be agreed upon by all five permanent members. This means in -particular that, once passed, any resolution can only be amended or rescindeddiscontinued only if theall permanent members agree. This also applies to decisions on the suspension or lifting of sanctions. In all non-procedural matters, practical issues the Security Council is, so-to-speak, held the hostage, so-to-speak ofby its own initial resolution. Accordingly, it is at the mercy of the veto-wielding powers that have uling, that is to say: held hostage by the veto powers who initiated the imposition of sanctions. initially imposed the sanctions. This was exactly the dilemma in the case of the Iraq sanctions. Albeit their effect (intended by the Council) and , the (humanitarian) of which impactconsequences (as intended by the council) were periodically reviewedmonitored and documented by the council according to schedule in conformity with the Council’s resolutions, but  because of the veto the Council was unable to draw the necessary consequencesno action could be taken as would have been necessary. There had been demands in the Ccouncil – especially by Russia – to discontinue the sanctions,  regime considering theirits adverse humanitarian impactsresults, b. But this proved to be was  impossible due to the above mentioned statutoary reasons outlined above. The sanctions would have remained in effectbeen in force forever had the United States not decided at some point that it wasthey were “«satisfied”» with their resultsresult. This washappened to be the case when the US when they themselves had occupied the country in 2003. Without furthermuch ado, the sanctions were lifted – in 2003 after when the government of Iraq had been removed by force. Thus, «“rRégime change”» must have been the real motivereason for the sanctions to be kept in placemaintained for more than a decade. [7]

This paradigmatic casesupreme example of power politics under UN auspices  has demonstrateddemonstrates  that it is impossible to take any measures of redress oncenot only the consequences of a resolution on coercive measures has been passed. The international community is utterly powerlesscoercive measure cannot be contained if there is a constellation in the Security Council with in a situation where at least one permanent member state preventing a former agreementobjects to the revision of a previous resolution (in the particular case, the lifting of concrete case: comprehensive economic sanctions). from being lifted – for The voting strategy is entirely at the discretion of the respective permanent member. It is not under any legal obligation to give reasons for its decision. reasons which they are unwilling, and not legally bound, to explain -   but that the international community is completely powerless. In that sense, the rules and regulationseasoning of the UN Ccharter reveal a kind of circular reasoning, or systemic contradictionis in fact circular.[8] The role of sanctions i

Furthermore, in the UN system of collective security, the rationale of sanctions is can only be to induce the sanctioned state into a change of its behaviour. This requires that the conditions for the lifting of sanctions are precisely defined. – which means that as a pre-condition for success the conditions for the sanctions to be lifted have to be defined precisely and in a rationally comprehensible way right from the beginning This is essential for– only then are sanctions justifiable and only under this pre-condition is  the international community to willing to accept coercive measures as an instrument of collective securitythis tool as an element to secure peace.

The people of sanctioned Sstates under sanctions – and the people affected by sanctions – mustneed to be able to see light at the end of the tunnel, and not only for humanitarian reasons. Once the circumstances in a country havesituation has changed, it must be possible to end a comprehensive sanctions regime (which is, strictly speaking, tantamount to collective punishment). This must be done according to clearly defined criteria, independently of considerations of power politics. Just to give one example: a state, for -instance – when a state – such as as in the case of Iraq – has ceased to be a threat to international peace, when this stateit has withdrawn its troops from occupied territory long ago long ago (in the case of Iraq: in 1991), from an occupied neighbouring state and has abandoned all weapons of mass destruction, it is intrinsically immoral and in violation of international humanitarian law to continue to subject the population of this state to collective punishment.en it mustneeds to be possible that a comprehensive sanctions regime, which is really some sort of collective punishment, will be lifted following a reproducible schedule instead of being abused for amoral, purely power-political goals.

In the early 1990ies I drew have already drawn attention to this problem in a paper about the ethical aspects of the Security Council’s sanctions policyies.[9] Following When after a statement by the International Progress Organization on the question of the compatibility of the Iraq sanctions with human rights before the UN Commission on Human Rights (1991),[10] and after further several initiatives byof international NGO´s, including the question of compatibility of the Iraq sanctions[11] with human rights posed by the International Progress Organization in 1991, that bodye UN human rights commission commissioned a report on issued an investigation into this matter, which the report reached similar conclusions.10

Conclusion

Sanctions are a tool of international politics, which must be seen asis incompatible with the ideas of diplomacy and peaceful co-existence amongof the nations. As is obvious from the provisionsregulations of Cchapter VII of the UN Ccharter clearly state, sanctions are coercive measures just one stage below the use of armed forcearmed conflict. In moral termsMorally speaking, this kind of coercive measures of this type indeed share the characteristics of war.

If unilaterally imposed, sanctions belong to the are merely a relic of the rule oflaw of the jungle. In that regard, they fit better into the  “«old»” system of international law where in which the jius ad bellum, the «“rRight to wage war,”», was the prerogative of  defined the sovereign state. However, there appears to be a consensus among scholars that, since the end of the First World War, the international community has gone beyond this «absolute» understanding of sovereigntywe all tend to agree that this viewpoint has been transcended since the end of the First World War.

MIf multilateral, sanctions, may be in theory at least,  are an instrument to secure the international rule of law, and in particulari.e. to strengthen the ban on the use of force and, subsequently, to maintain peace among nations. and outlaw violence in international relations - Multilateral sanctions are portrayed in this positive light notwithstanding the fact that, as far as the Council’s permanent members are concerned, the very states that are responsible for their imposition – and, by virtue of the veto, their indefinite prolongation – enjoy, due to that same privilege, de facto legal immunity as regards the political and humanitarian consequences. Strictly speaking, this kind of arbitrary rule borders they have this status despite the circumstance, that due to their right to veto, the permanent member states enjoy in fact ”legal” immunity, no matter what sanctions they agree upon, a situation bordering on despotism. Furthermore, bBecause of theis permanent members’ very right to veto of the permanent member states, these privileges statutory provisions are not likely to change in the foreseeable futureany time soon.[12] AsSo long as there exists is no better alternative or to the  existing better world organization available, we must reluctantly live with the fact that everyone needs to put a smile on their faces and suffer those risks of multi-lateral sanctions regimes entail the risks we have , as I described them above, gladly.

One can only hope that such a global power constellation such as that in the one of the early 1990ies – after the end of shortly after the Cold War – will not repeat itself. What matters here is aA balance of power in the Security Council is crucial in this regard itself, and not only on paper. As for the UN Ccharter, the veto right of the permanent members embodies the rationale of such a nominal balance (among those five states). power balance is guaranteed by the permanent members´ right to veto. But this is not the point. What is needed is aA real balance of power in real, not merely procedural (statutory), terms. This is necessary, which actually did not exist in 1990 and the following years – when the Soviet Union was in the final stages of disintegration, and, subsequently, Russia  had a president whose policies thrusted  manoeuvred the country towards the edge of the abyss. In a situation wherewhen no countrystate is strong and bold enough to stand up against a dominantthe dominating state – in this instance, the USe concrete case the USA, – there is, almost  inevitably, the riskdanger that all participants at the negotiatinground table will duck down and not dare to say «nNo.» In the years after 1990, tThis became apparent, in particular, in the voting behaviorpatterns of small and medium states (asi.e. non-permanent members in the Security Council members). in the years after 1990. Just to give one example in connection with the Iraq crisis: In back door There had been backstage meetings at the UN headquarters, where representatives of the most powerful member stateonly remaining super power confronted envoys ofexplained to some developing countriesthird world country with the prospect that there would be no military or, economicdevelopment  aid would no longer be forthcoming etc. being paid any longer should the country vote against a certain oppose the respective Security Council resolutiondecision.[13]

The use of mMultilateral sanctions imposed as a tool of foreign policy for by the only remaining superworld power had only been possible  to pursue their policy – resulting in a massive violation of human rights in the affected population because this country was able to exploit the absence of a global balance of power– had only been possible by an abuse of the global power imbalance, as outlined above. In more than one case, this resulted in a massive violation of human rights of the population in the targeted countries. Against this background, it is absolutely essential Insofar it is essential that the permanent members of the Security Council, being vested (under current regulations) with the power to prevent the imposition of in addition to being entitled to veto a coercive measures,  actually are strong enough, in economic as well as military terms, to withstand any potential pressure from their more powerful peers – or from the most powerful member state (depending on the constellation).have the actual real economic and military power to confront the most powerful state. In the harsh environment of global power politics, this One could refer to that as a realpolitik corrective of realpolitik, which  will beis indispensable as long as legal provisionscorrective measures are not ultimately effective enough. In this regard, the only reason for hope lies in t The gradual emergence of tendency towards a new multipolar balance of power at the global levelity, i.e. a new global balance of power, gives at least reason for hope.