ABSTRACT

The legitimacy of a political system is essentially determined by its ability to restrict, and ultimately prevent, the exercise of violence in society on the basis of clearly defined legal rules and procedures, so as to ensure political stability and a dignified life for all citizens. Any political use of violence, whether by interest groups or state organs, must be prevented.

The use of force by the state must be restricted to the prevention, or containment, of violent acts domestically and to the repulsion of violence (aggression) internationally. Accordingly, under the rule of law, the only option is the legal use of force as a measure of self-defense of the polity, and within the checks and balances of the constitution. A deliberate “policy of violence” – that is based on the creation of fear among the citizens – is not only incompatible with basic human rights, but is diametrically opposed to the raison d’être of every state.

At the same time, the state has the responsibility to provide conditions of social justice and equality to all its citizens so as to eliminate possible causes of violence. When it comes to a sustainable policy of the avoidance of violence, justice and the rule of law are the reverse side of the coin.

On the basis of these maxims, the paper (1) analyzes the nature and scope of violence in the context of political philosophy and contemporary international law. The paper describes the destructive impact of violence on social cohesion and political order in general, and deals with its delegitimizing effect at the national and international level. After an assessment of the specific role and duty of the state and its legal system, the paper (2) explains the social, political and legal implications of violence at the national level (especially in situations of civil war and domestic terrorism) and (3) analyzes the international use of violence (between states as well as against states by groups or individuals, as in the cases of international terrorism). The interdependence between domestic and international violence is particularly explored. The paper (4) concludes with a reflection on the exclusionary nature and effect of violence in contrast to the integrative mandate of the state, and draws the political and legal consequences from a general ban on the use of force for political aims.

 

(I)

Violence and state authority*

Civilization requires, first and foremost, the taming of violence. Many philosophers have described the “state of nature” as the opposite of civilization. In this primitive state, anarchy and lawlessness prevail,_[1] conditions that make it impossible for a society to prosper, and which prevent the advancement of humanity – in the individual as well as in the collective sense._[2]

One of the decisive criteria or measures for a group’s (a collective’s, a nation’s) civilizational status is the extent to which it is able to control violent behavior of its members, but also of itself as a collective actor (state) vis-à-vis other collectives (states). The “basic lesson of civilization,” one might say, is that of moral self-constraint in terms of social behavior. Unlike in the state of nature, in the state of civilization, violence as a form of social interaction is to be replaced, albeit realistically only in gradual steps, by co-operation – a form of behavior that requires (a) mutual respect and (b) the acceptance of general rules of behavior that are derived from the principle of equality of all human beings.

It is against this background that the antagonism between law and violence becomes a central issue of state identity. It is the special role of the state, as organizational structure, to ensure the suppression of violent behavior by its citizens, and to achieve this goal on the basis of clearly defined legal norms. This is why the state must possess the “monopoly of violence” (in the sense of a monopoly of the legitimate use of force)_[3] – in order to preserve an order of non-violence and peace among its citizens._[4] The very essence of the rule of law lies in this authority of the state at the meta-level, namely its power to “enforce” the basic norm of non-violence on a consistent and sustainable basis. This alone will enable the citizens of the state to live free of fear and, thus, to fully develop their humanity; and this capability alone will distinguish a state, as a legitimate legal entity, from a “failed state” – where the state’s inability to control violence among groups on its territory, its loss of the monopoly on violence, has led to a situation of anarchy.

Reversely, the state, as the enforcer of the law, must not itself engage in a policy of violence against its citizens. Force must only be used in the interest of the common good, namely for the preservation of the state’s legal order (including the norm of non-violence), and within strict legal (constitutional) constraints. This applies to the domestic, but also to the international level – where the Preamble to the UN Charter clearly states “that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.”_[5] Only a dictatorship would adopt violence as a state policy.

In order to analyze the phenomenon of violence properly, it is essential to distinguish between violence as a symptom and violence as a method (i.e. as a tool). The latter characterizes the action of the state as enforcer of norms (which is its constitutional role) – but also, in the case of authoritarian rule, as oppressive power, while the former relates to a possible form of reaction by an individual, a group, or a state, to an actual or perceived injustice or objectionable behavior. In order to minimize the inclination, or resort, to violent behavior as reaction to perceived injustices, the creation of a just and equal society should be the main priority for a state that is committed to the rule of law, as it should also be the main concern for the international community in regard to inter-state relations. At the domestic level, this concern – in terms of the reactive aspect of violence – is echoed in the words of the late Martin Luther King, Jr.: “A riot is the language of the unheard.”_[6]

In order to avoid misunderstandings in terms of the legal implications, a brief conceptual clarification is in place. In contemporary discourse, especially in international relations theory, the terms “violence” and “force” are often used interchangeably._[7] Semantically, “force” has a wider meaning that also includes, for instance, the “force of arguments” in the sense of the “power” or “strength” of a certain position._[8] “Force,” thus, could be described, more generally, in the sense of the exertion of power, which may, though not necessarily, include violent means. The “force of the law,” however, is ultimately guaranteed by violent means. The main distinction here is between arbitrary violence as a method of fear and intimidation (as in a dictatorship or tyranny, or through a tactic of terrorism_[9]) and the use of violent means on the basis of specific legal provisions, and within a system of checks and balances (i.e. under the rule of law) as, for instance, in a democracy or in a constitutional state.

The issue of the specific role of violence in the context of politics gives rise to the intricate ethical question as to whether “the end justifies the means” – and under which specific conditions._[10] All through history, this has been one of the most challenging questions of state legitimacy.

 

(II)

Violence at the domestic level

At the national (domestic) level, the resort to violence has a long and varied history – in different socio-economic contexts and within different civilizations. In situations where (a) a state fails to ensure fairness and justice to all its citizens, or (b) the state structure collapses due to internal or external factors,_[11] or (c) under conditions of sectarianism where ethnic, religious, or social groups have succeeded to put their interests above those of the nation _[12: in all those situations violence may be perceived by the protagonists as the only means (1) to settle disputes (that would otherwise be dealt with through negotiations and rational discourse), and, more generally, (2) to preserve a group’s interests in an essentially anarchic struggle for survival, without any consideration for the common good or the integrity of the state as such._[13]

There are three typical situations of political violence_[14] – or violence as a “political language”_[15] – in the domestic context (which, however, cannot be isolated from the transnational dimension_[16]):

(A)             Civil war situations: Examples are: the confessional conflicts in 16^th and 17^th century Europe; ethnic conflicts in the wake of state collapse such as the violence on the territory of the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s; uprisings in the Arab world since 2011, which have resulted from situations characterized under (a) above, and, in some cases, have led to confrontations described under (c). These conflicts often include acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide._[17]

(B)              Domestic terrorism: This means the use of violence by individuals or groups to achieve specific political goals (that may be related to economic, cultural or religious issues or grievances). These uses of violence are essentially aimed at creating fear among the civilian population and/or directed at institutions that are identified with the power and authority of the state._[18]

(C)             Violence used by the state as a means of terror (“state terrorism”) to impose and maintain an unjust order or to uphold totalitarian control over its citizens:_[19] This extreme and arbitrary (illegal) use of violence by state organs is not to be confused with what would be tolerable as (legal) exercise of the “monopoly of violence,” including the use of armed force, by a legitimate state and within the constraints defined by law._[20]

Media violence

Apart from these typical situations, or constellations, of the political use of violence, there are two pervasive societal trends that underlie, and reinforce, a “climate of violence” which is detrimental to social cohesion and political stability, whether in the short or in the long term. The latter seems to be the case with a kind of mega-trend in the consumer societies of the modern industrialized world: Violence has become a rather common ingredient of entertainment. For essentially commercial reasons, the media industry seems to have opted to engage in, and exploit, a “cult of violence” that, in the meantime, has become a hallmark of modern pop culture._[21] This is more than obvious in an ever larger number of movies, computer games, Internet sites, etc. In a comprehensive and far-reaching analysis and documentation, American scholar Nancy Signorielli bluntly stated: “Although violence has always been a part of society and human nature, at no other time in history have people of all ages and walks of life been exposed to as many violent images and messages as they are today.”_[22] It goes without saying that the heroization or glorification of violence, or its exploitation for purposes of entertainment, goes against the moral teachings of virtually all religions. Nonetheless, the public does not in any way seem to be immune against the persuasions of the industry._[23]

Due to individual states’ – and the international community’s – proven inability (or lack of resolve?) to contain this trend, the consequences are indeed deep and serious. They are visible in what one might call the “brutalization” of social attitudes, especially in the field of youth culture. It should surprise non one if, in the long term, this kind of violent social culture will lead to the fragmentation of society (threatening the stability of the state and its legal order) and to a “politics of violence” where the resort to naked force is not anymore taboo (whether in individual or group behavior). In this regard, we also must not overlook the brutalizing effect of wars on society in general._[24]

Electoral violence

The other pervasive trend, with short- as well as long-term effects, is particularly dominant in the non-Western world (although it was quite common in 20th century Europe before World War II). In many a country, the “politics of violence” has become a characteristic feature of electoral competition. Conflicts of interests and ideological disputes are waged with violent means, whether by parties or other societal groups, or by the executive power of the government (police or military forces). The tactics of intimidation, including the use of lethal force, are similar, in nature, to terrorist violence. Campaigns that are supposed to be a (peaceful) competition between political programs and ideas, to facilitate rational choice by the populace, often degenerate into fierce fights that remind one of the literal, not just metaphorical, meaning of the German word Wahlkampf (“electoral battle”). One could mention here many recent examples such as the violent confrontations, in connection with elections and the competition between political parties, in Afghanistan, Algeria,_[25] Iraq, Libya, South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh),_[26] Philippines, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya,_[27] Zambia,_[28] etc. This kind of political violence was endemic in Europe in the period between the two world wars (e. g. in Nazi Germany,_[29] among fascist movements in other European countries, in the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik revolution, in the years of Stalinist terror, etc.)._[30] In a commentary on the situation in Kenya (which has also brought about the involvement of the International Criminal Court), Daniel Branch notes a dangerous trend in domestic politics, which he characterizes as the “normalization of violence.” This also applies to the “politicization of violence” (i.e. the use of violence as an instrument of politics) in the other countries mentioned here. In Branch’s analysis of the events in Kenya, “violence has become a well-established means by which power and authority […] is contested in a variety of settings.”_[31]

In such a context – where violence increasingly replaces lawful means of political competition – the polity disintegrates and the state, having abandoned the “monopoly of violence,” gradually loses its legitimacy. The country risks becoming a “failed state” whose fate may affect, and destabilize, not only the neighbouring states, but even the wider region. This is the typical situation of anarchy which (1), directly, is the result of uncontrolled violence between groups of society and (2), indirectly, the consequence of the state’s loss of the monopoly of violence.

Spill-over effect of domestic violence

The international dimension of domestic violence is particularly obvious in the socio-political dynamic of civil war. The combatants, representing rival groups in terms of ethnicity, religion or vested interests, will sooner or later, and almost unavoidably, (a) look for outside support, or (b) attract outside involvement (whether intended or not), or (c) try to “export” the conflict to neighboring countries (as a tactic of war). The developments triggered by the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, among others, are clear evidence of this risk. In 20^th century history, the civil war in Spain was another example of the “transnational dynamic “of civil strife._[32]

The repercussions of “internationalization” – in terms of the dynamic of an originally domestic conflict and the impact and scope of violence – are far-reaching and serious:

(a)               An increase in the intensity and duration of the conflict: Outside support, or the expectation of it, will make conflicting parties even more intransigent und less inclined to seek compromise with their adversaries._[33] This will not only be detrimental to a negotiated settlement, which is obvious, but it will also have a long-term negative impact on social cohesion and peace.

(b)               Regional destabilization: Due to the involvement of third parties in otherwise local disputes or tensions, the threat of terrorist acts in neighboring countries may increase. The interdependence between local and foreign conflict situations may well create the risk of a chain reaction at the regional level. Examples are the situation in and around Iraq and, more recently, in and around Syria. In our era of global interdependence, civil wars and other forms of violence at the domestic level, mutually reinforcing each other at the regional level, may also have worldwide repercussions. Domestic and international violence cannot anymore be seen in isolation.

 

(III)

Violence at the international level

In a general sense, international violence can be defined (a) as violence by and between states (“war”) and (b) as violence by non-state actors against states. Historically, it has been one of the main concerns of international law to regulate, and tame, the use of force between states._[34] War and the violent settlement of disputes has nonetheless been one of the main features of the history of mankind.

An analysis of violence and its impact on human rapprochement at the international level will have to deal with the issue of war-proneness of states and its structural (systemic) reasons. There are basically two aspects, or criteria, of a state’s inclination to the external (international) use of violence:

(a)               War-proneness of authoritarian states (that practice a “policy of violence” domestically): Aggressive behavior vis-à-vis other states (externally) to divert attention from internal problems (that result from domestic oppression and the deep social frustrations caused by it) is a historically proven pattern of behavior of authoritarian and repressive régimes. Conversely, it is argued that democracies are also more peaceful internationally. Following Rudolph J. Rummel and his extensive statistics of state behavior,_[35] the advocates of the “democratic peace theory”_[36] have been trying to prove that there is indeed a negative correlation between the democratic organization of a polity and its inclination to aggressive behavior externally. It is further argued that democracies do not engage in violent conflict with each other._[37]

(b)               War-proneness of great powers (i. e. as a characteristic of power politics)_[38], irrespective of whether the governmental system is “authoritarian” (repressive) or “democratic”: A case in point is the so-called “humanitarian interventions” of the post-Cold War era._[39] Under the influence and effective leadership of great powers, military operations that would otherwise be outlawed under modern international law have been repeatedly undertaken with the proclaimed aim of protecting the civilian population in situations of civil war. However, it is to be ascertained in each and every case whether the stated humanitarian motive (“responsibility to protect”) is more than a tool of legitimization of an agenda of power politics that would, in its own right, not justify the use of violent means._[40]

The “bellicose,” and absolute, understanding of sovereignty (that is often characteristic of great powers) is nowhere more poignantly expressed than in the dictum originally attributed to Cardinal Richelieu of France, and later adopted by Louis XIV of France and King Frederick the Great of Prussia, according to which the “cannons” are the ultima ratio regum (“the last resort of kings”)._[41]

Historically, violent behavior of states was understood to be one of the political options that belong to the exercise of state sovereignty. The jus ad bellum (“right to war”) was considered a natural prerogative of the sovereign ruler. A paradigm change in terms of international law – and morality – occurred only rather recently with the general ban on the use of force in the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 and in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (1945)._[42] In view of these developments, war cannot anymore be considered – according to the famous dictum of von Clausewitz – as the “continuation of politics by other means.”_[43] The ban on the use of force also includes the interdiction of the threat of force since a threat, as intimidation of the other, is itself of violent nature._[44]

Irrespective of the potential merits of a multilateral use of force for strictly humanitarian purposes, one must be aware of the demoralizing effect of unilateral uses of force on the international community (such as the occupation of Palestinian territories in 1967, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, or the invasion of Iraq in 2003, to mention only a few). How should the community of states ever be convinced, and prepared, to respect the general ban on the use of force – the main requirement of sustainable peace – if the most powerful states simply neglect that principle, putting the assertion of their “national interests” above international law and morality; and how should the citizens be convinced of the (moral as well as legal) legitimacy of these undertakings?

Furthermore, resort to war (namely the unilateral use of force) totally undermines and discredits the idea of international solidarity, and it creates mistrust between the peoples. A violent foreign policy that operates with ultimatums and threats of intervention against other states makes a mockery of the United Nations Charter’s principle of “sovereign equality” (Article 2[1]) and precludes partnership between sovereign states. It further strengthens prejudices and reinforces enemy stereotypes, conjuring up the very “clash of civilizations” that has become a major concern since the end of the Cold War._[45]

It is a well-established historical fact, rooted in the psychology of collective behavior, that aggressive action of states against other states not only leads to violent reactions by the targeted countries, but also may trigger chain reactions of international violence such as last century’s two world wars. The dictum “violence begets violence,” famously used by Martin Luther King, Jr. in the era of race struggle in the United States,_[46] is particularly pertinent in the transnational domain.

It is therefore no surprise that, in view of the systemic repercussions and in the interest of a stable global order, the use of violent means is only admissible as an exception, and in the service of the common interest._[47] This relates to (individual and collective) self-defense according to Article 51 of the UN Charter and to measures “to maintain or restore international peace and security” on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter. The underlying idea is that of collective security – in distinction from the arbitrariness of unilateral action that has been characteristic of traditional power politics.

Among the most pervasive forms of inter-state violence are the occupation and/or annexation of foreign territory. It has indeed been one of the most enduring causes of conflict since ancient times, and not only since the era of colonialism. As outright negation of the right to self-determination, which has been generally recognized since the end of the colonial era, armed occupation has not only provoked reactive violence (“liberation struggles”) on the part of subjugated peoples, but also has challenged the very system of rules (“international rule of law”) on which today’s global order is built._[48]

 The arrogance of power, which is typical of imperial (or, more precisely, imperialist) rule, is also obvious in the ambition to reshape the cultural and civilizational identity of entire nations in the image of the conqueror (or the intervening power)._[49] A case in point is the policy of “régime change,” or the imposition of a different political system, on another polity by military force (instead of through diplomacy and persuasion or, gradually, through economic co-operation). Such uses of force have often proven to breed further resentment, and to destabilize the polity in question. They have almost always ultimately been counterproductive – not to speak of their legally dubious nature (even if undertaken in the framework of “humanitarian intervention” or as actions based on the “responsibility to protect”)._[50]

Another systemic problem of the use of violence in today’s international order is directly related to the tradition of imperial rule in 19^th century Europe, and to the emphasis on national sovereignty in an exclusivist meaning (that, in a certain sense, is also documented in the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter). The five “great powers” of 1945_[51] – all of whom have acquired nuclear capability – enjoy a special – one might say excessive – privilege as “permanent members” of the United Nations Security Council. Due to the veto provision of Article 27 of the Charter, they are the only countries that effectively are in a position to use force against other states (i. e. unilaterally) without the fear of coercive measures against themselves._[52] Shortly after the foundation of the world organization, the Austrian legal philosopher Hans Kelsen has identified this as a major problem of, or obstacle to, the international rule of law (the achievement of which is absolutely essential for peaceful co-operation among member states as equals): “The veto right of the permanent members of the Security Council places them above the law of the United Nations, establishes their legal hegemony over all the other Members, and thus stamps the Organization with the mark of an autocratic regime.”_[53] It is not surprising that this privilege encouraged – or reinforced – what nowadays is called a “policy of double standards” in matters of international security and peace. It risks making the United Nations system of collective security (that is based on the sovereign equality of states)_[54] entirely dysfunctional – with the long-term erosion of the very legitimacy of the United Nations Organization as a consequence. As recent history has demonstrated, the veto has also effectively undermined the general ban on the use of force, and indirectly encouraged the use of violent means for political purposes – and not only by the most powerful international actors.

In our era of globalization, with the ever more complex interdependence between states with different social, cultural, economic and political systems, a militaristic foreign policy and the unilateral use of violence have not only brought about an increase of regional tensions and made the world less safe, but also have contributed to a global climate of confrontation with civilizational undertones._[55]

International terrorism

The recent phenomenon of international terrorism cannot be seen in isolation from the unilateral use of violence by states. The controversy around the “global war on terror” touches upon the very essence of the use of violent means by state and non-state actors alike. It relates to basic questions of the moral and legal qualification of the use of force in the context of global power relations. Terrorism, as instrumentalization of violence for political purposes, is an almost classical case of the maxim “the end justifies the means,” which expresses a perennial dilemma of political and legal philosophy also in the face of the state’s monopoly on violence._[56]

For the purpose of definition, we understand as “international terrorism”:

trans-border and/or internationally organized and politically motivated acts of violence against civilians or state institutions or state representatives with the aim of (a) destabilizing or destroying a state’s political order, or (b) realizing a particular group’s political (social or national) aspirations – whether domestically or in a larger regional or even global context. (The latter motivation is specifically ideological and not merely related to social or economic grievances.)_[57]

In general, the modus operandi of terrorism is that of instilling fear, and its logic is that of blackmail. There are no other acts of violence that would be more incompatible with, or diametrically opposed to, social harmony at the domestic and peaceful co-existence at the international level. In the absence of a legally agreed definition,_[58] the General Assembly of the United Nations has characterized terrorism as “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political reasons.”_[59] It is to be noted that an “operative” definition of terrorism includes acts of non-state and state actors (“state terrorism”) alike._[60] If we follow this definition, the notion “global war on terror” will have to be clarified in the sense of a joint, not unilateral, worldwide effort to eliminate the causes of terrorist acts and to apprehend those responsible._[61]

Any analysis of the phenomenon of international terrorism is superficial, and will not be conducive to the formulation of policy options, if it does not also deal with violence as a symptom, which means addressing the (ideological) motives and (social or economic) causes of terrorist acts. To merely describe those acts of violence as acts of pure evil, committed by evil people for the sake of evil, means to refuse a causal analysis based on a rational assessment of specific social, economic, cultural and historical factors. This form of demonization of violence gives terrorism a quasi-metaphysical dimension, which it does not possess under the conditions of real politics._[62]

Terrorism, as a strategy, is targeting the state as such; it is aiming at the very integrity of the polity (as community of citizens). Terrorist violence is meant to break the bonds of solidarity between the citizens and to undermine, and ultimately destroy, the confidence the citizen has in the state as guarantor of public order and individual freedom, and as embodiment of the rule of law._[63]

Accordingly, the tactics of terror are defined by unpredictable and random violence. Terrorism, including a state policy of terror,_[64] may well contribute to, and be the cause of, state collapse (as in the cases of Somalia or Libya) while it may also be a symptom of a failed state. This duality of symptom and cause drastically demonstrates the complexity of a phenomenon that threatens social cohesion domestically (since it may lead to the fragmentation of society into mutually suspicious groups)_[65] and undermines, in an international context, the confidence that is indispensable for durable peace among nations._[66]

Terrorism expresses the logic of war in its purest and most extreme form. The terrorist’s tactic to impose his will by brute force precludes any form of a negotiated settlement of the dispute or grievances that, whether justified or not, may be at stake in a given constellation. One may thus say about the nature of terrorist violence that it is not merely illegal, but intrinsically unethical, and that, in many instances, it has the nature of collective punishment.

In the interest of the community of citizens it embodies, the state nonetheless has to react to the terrorist challenge in a rational, not vengeful, manner. In order to be able to address the grievances that may have led to terrorist acts, the state has to analyze the causes of violence in all their complexity._[67] The maxim of political wisdom – in regard to the challenge of terrorist violence – could be summarized as the need for: “understanding terrorism also as a symptom, but not dealing merely with the symptoms.” Security measures, as advanced and sophisticated as they may be, can only be ad hoc steps that will have to be complemented by a political approach and a long-term strategy of “containment” in a comprehensive social, cultural and economic sense.

A policy that is oriented towards societal harmony, at the domestic level, and informed by a co-operative attitude, at the international level, is indeed the best antidote to terrorist violence. The effort dubbed the “global war on terror” will be doomed to fail if the states engaged in it refuse to identify and address the root causes, and if the rationale of that “war” is just that of a more efficient and sophisticated use of violent means (in comparison to those of the terrorists)._[68] Dealing with the symptoms can never be a surrogate for a comprehensive political strategy against terrorist violence.

  

 

(IV)

Conclusion:
The exclusionary nature of violence versus the inclusive mandate of politics

A harmonious society – at the domestic, regional and global level – is only possible if the use of violence is restricted to the meta-level, namely as a measure of last resort to enforce the very ban on violence (between individuals as well as collectives, by state as well as non-state actors):

(a)    Domestically, this refers to the role of the state whose “monopoly of violence” means the authority to use of force within the limits of the law and for the enforcement of that very law. For that supreme authority to be perceived as legitimate, a functioning separation of powers, and in particular an independent judiciary, are indispensable._[69] Only such provisions can prevent the arbitrary exercise of state power, which, in turn, may breed violence and undermine social cohesion.

(b)   Internationally, the exercise of violence at the meta-level refers to the role of the United Nations Security Council and its authority, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to maintain or restore international peace and security. However, it seems to be the predicament of the world organization that its Charter lacks the essential provisions for a genuine separation of powers._[70] This structural deficiency has been at the roots of the legitimacy problem of the United Nations Organization as guarantor of peace and the international rule of law ever since its foundation._[71]

Apart from these uses of force at the meta-level (in the sense of emergency measures to preserve the common good and the rule of law),_[72] violence, in general, is an extreme rejection of rationality. It precludes the resolution of a dispute or conflict of interests (whether between individuals, between collectives [states], or between individuals and collectives) on the basis of an open discourse among the parties.

Only free and open debate can help individuals as well as collectives (states) (a) to analyze the exact nature and underlying reasons of a dispute, (b) to identify common ground between divergent positions, and (c) to eventually reach a compromise which, in turn, can be the basis for lasting peace according to the (rational) principle of mutuality. Resort to violence as a means of politics is always a defeat of reason and common sense. History has amply proven that this makes force ultimately ineffective. Furthermore, as Noam Chomsky pointed out, violence “antagonizes the uncommitted” and thus is counterproductive even according to its own aspirations._[73]

In terms of social order, violence is exclusionary and a total rejection of human dignity. It means negation of the other (whether individual, group or state) and reduces the human being to the status of a mere object (as target of aggression, in the most extreme form even of annihilation). Nonviolence, in contrast, to use the words of Mahatma Gandhi, “is the law of the human race and is infinitely greater than and superior to brute force.”_[74]

History has amply proven the destructive nature of violence in relation to the state as a community of citizens. Violence, whether used by individuals or groups, is incompatible with a sense of joint purpose that, in turn, is indispensable for the state as guarantor of public order (and thus for the enjoyment of rights by all its citizens) and for the state’s role as a sovereign actor at the international level. As a political tactic, violence is also self-defeating. In the often quoted words of Martin Luther King, Jr., “The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral, begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy.”_[75]

Violence indeed represents the animal instincts of the human race. It has to be transcended towards a pattern of behavior that is based on the rational capacity of man, which means conflict resolution through careful, and honest, analysis of points of difference and identification of possible areas of compromise. This is the fundamental task of politics – insofar as politics is indeed committed to the common good. At the level of relations between states, this means that the paradigm of power politics has to be transcended towards a co-operative model of diplomacy which alone is in conformity with the sovereign equality of states, a basic principle of modern international law.

The glorification of violence and war, which too often in history has been an accompaniment of politics,_[76] must be replaced by an enlightened attitude that focuses on the common interests of mankind and that relegates the use of force to the very enforcement of its prohibition – as paradoxically as this may sound. Human rapprochement and peace among nations cannot be envisaged in any other way.

^***